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REGULATING BANKRUPTCY: PUBLIC CHOICE, 
IDEOLOGY, & BEYOND 
A. MECHELE DICKERSON∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For almost a decade, members of Congress fiercely debated legislation 
that would make it harder for people to discharge their debts in 
bankruptcy. The legislation was finally enacted on April 20, 2005, when 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(“BAPCPA”)1 was signed into law.2 BAPCPA became fully effective for 
cases filed on or after October 17, 2005. At one of the earliest hearings on 
the proposed bankruptcy legislation, one of the bill’s sponsors suggested 
that “it is probably incorrect to suggest this is a credit card versus 
consumer problem.”3 Yet throughout Congressional debates on the 
legislation, and even after BAPCPA was enacted, many argued that 
BAPCPA was written by, bought, and paid for by the consumer credit 
industry, especially the credit card industry.4 Given the vast sums the 
consumer credit industry contributed both to individual members and 
political action committees,5 it is understandable that many used public 
choice theory—i.e., the application of microeconomic assumptions to help 
explain how public officials make decisions6—to critique the BAPCPA 
legislative process.  
 
 
 ∗ Fulbright and Jaworski Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School. I am grateful to 
Professors Ronald Mann, Robert Peroni, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook for the helpful comments and 
suggestions they made during the early stages of this paper. The paper also benefited from questions 
posed by participants at a workshop at the University of Texas Law School and at the 2006 F. Hodge 
O’Neal Workshop. I thank Professor Nancy Staudt for inviting me to participate in the F. Hodge 
O’Neal Workshop and thank Rachel Devenow and Sarah Barr for research assistance.  
 1. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 
Stat. 23 (2005). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See The Increase in Personal Bankruptcy and the Crisis in Consumer Credit: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th 
Cong. 66 (1997) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions). For statements that suggest that the bill pits people 
versus the credit card industry, see 149 CONG. REC. H1983, H1986 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2003) 
(statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee); 146 CONG. REC. 26347, 26348–49 (2000) (statement of Rep. 
Wellstone); 144 CONG. REC. 22615, 22622 (1998) (statement of Rep. Kennedy); 144 CONG. REC. 
24926, 24926, 24928 (1998) (statement of Rep. Nadler). 
 4. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S2216 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin); 151 
CONG. REC. H2084 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. McDermott).  
 5. See Alexander, infra note 78. 
 6. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.  
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As BAPCPA has been fully effective for over two years, it is now 
appropriate to consider whether the storyline of the consumer credit 
industry singlehandedly capturing Congress and buying a bill—i.e., the 
single industry capture story—is valid and, if not, how best to tell the 
BAPCPA “story.” Telling the BAPCPA story as a single industry’s ability 
to buy votes is appealing and largely justifiable, although ultimately 
unsatisfactory given the provisions in BAPCPA that protect other special 
interest groups—notably women, retirees, and members of the armed 
services—but are adverse to the interests of the consumer credit industry. 
Also, using only a public choice perspective does not explain why it took 
almost a decade to get the legislation passed, nor does it adequately 
consider how certain ideological issues appear to have affected the 
legislative process. 
Of course, suggesting that bankruptcy laws are ideological may strike 
some as nonsensical. Indeed, during the Senate confirmation hearings for 
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., the Washington Post examined a number of 
judicial opinions in which he took part but excluded all bankruptcy cases 
from that examination based on its conclusion that bankruptcy cases are 
“non-ideological.”7 Even if the Federal Bankruptcy Code8 itself is non-
ideological (an assertion that this Article will not directly challenge), 
describing BAPCPA’s legislative process without discussing the role that 
hot button ideological issues—like states’ rights, abortion, and the concept 
of “personal responsibility”—played in the legislative process would 
eliminate at least several mini-plots from the story.  
This Article presents a fuller, more nuanced BAPCPA story that is 
designed to debunk the notion that the BAPCPA legislative process is 
simply the triumph of one powerful interest group—the credit card 
lobby—over a weaker group—consumer debtors. Part I of the Article 
describes BAPCPA’s history and the role that the consumer credit lobby 
played in getting, then keeping, bankruptcy bills before Congress. In 
generally describing the legislative process, this Part notes that, 
notwithstanding fierce debates, opponents and supporters of the legislation 
agreed on a number of key factual matters relating to the bankruptcy 
“crisis.” This Part notes, though, that legislators disagreed over other core 
issues, including what people should do to avoid becoming overindebted 
and what they should do once they are too far in debt.  
Part II briefly describes public choice theory and explains the appeal of 
using this theory to explain the bankruptcy reform legislative process. This 
 
 
 7. About the Analysis, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2006, at A14. 
 8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2000). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/7
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Part suggests that public choice theory was most often used to explain why 
Congress passed BAPCPA because the consumer credit industry made 
such significant campaign and political action committee contributions 
while past, current, and future individual debtors failed to organize and 
lobby against the bankruptcy legislation. 
Part III shows how, over the course of the legislative process, 
legislators considered the interests of other powerful groups, notably 
women, retirees, and veterans. This Part stresses that members of 
Congress agreed on a number of amendments to the bankruptcy legislation 
to protect these constituents’ interests. Ultimately, this caused Congress to 
amend BAPCPA in ways that harmed the interests of the consumer credit 
lobby.  
While conceding the difficulties in defining the word “ideology” and 
the additional difficulty of precisely measuring whether a legislator’s 
ideology influenced a vote on any given bill, Part IV briefly discusses the 
role that ideology appeared to play in the legislative process. This Part 
argues that some relevant ideological issues (such as how people 
reasonably should be expected to govern their personal finances) and other 
ideological issues that were raised but were at best only tangentially 
relevant (such as abortion and minimum wage) played crucial roles in 
shaping the text of the bankruptcy legislation.  
Part V argues that the single industry capture story is incomplete and 
that BAPCPA’s legislative process can best be understood as one that 
required legislators to balance several interests. On one side is legislators’ 
desire to continue to receive financial support from the consumer credit 
lobby; this is balanced against their individual worldviews and philosophy 
toward “personal responsibility” and their desire to avoid alienating large 
blocs of politically influential voters. 
II. HISTORY OF BAPCPA  
A.  National Bankruptcy Review Commission 
BAPCPA’s origins generally can be traced to the activities of the 
National Bankruptcy Review Commission (the “Commission”).9 In 
enacting bipartisan legislation to create the nine-member Commission in 
1994, Congress stressed that it was essentially satisfied with the 
Bankruptcy Code’s (the “Code”) framework for consumer cases.10 At that 
 
 
 9. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 601–10, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 
Stat.) 4106, 4147–50.  
 10. H.R. REP. NO. 103-835, at 59 (1994).  
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time, consumers who sought bankruptcy relief had an almost unfettered 
right to choose whether to discharge some debts and relinquish all but 
exempt assets in Chapter 7, or to discharge significantly more debts, keep 
almost all assets—including assets they could not claim as exempt—and 
attempt to repay at least some debts in Chapter 13. When Congress created 
the Commission it did not indicate that it felt consumers were abusing the 
bankruptcy system or that the Code needed to be radically restructured to 
respond to increased credit card use. Indeed, the Commission’s work was 
described as “reviewing, improving and updating the Code in ways which 
do not disturb the fundamental tenets and balance of current law.”11  
The Commission ultimately conducted a comprehensive, often 
contentious, review of the consumer bankruptcy provisions of the Code. 
Despite the scope (not to mention length) of the Commission’s 1997 
Report (the “Report”),12 the Commission decided not to recommend 
radical changes to the existing consumer bankruptcy laws. Four of the nine 
members of the Commission fundamentally disagreed with this decision, 
based on their view that consumer bankruptcy laws needed significant 
structural revisions. Specifically, these commissioners argued that higher 
income Chapter 7 debtors should be prevented from receiving a quick, i.e., 
Chapter 7, discharge unless they could prove that they did not have the 
ability to repay a certain portion of their debts over time.13 Despite these 
minority views, and the extensive lobbying the Commission received from 
the consumer credit industry,14 the Commission rejected the view that 
Chapter 7 should be “means tested”15 or otherwise limited to debtors who 
prove they lacked the means to repay their debts. 
 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, 1 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW 
COMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS (1997) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION]. The Report was over 1,300 pages long and had over 
791 pages of appendices.  
 13. See Edith H. Jones & James I. Shepard, Additional Dissent to Recommendations for Reform 
of Consumer Bankruptcy Law, in REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, Ch. 
5, 36 (1997). 
 14. See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 375, 376 (noting the extensive benefits reaped by the credit industry as a result of its 
lobbying efforts); Elizabeth Warren, The Market for Data: The Changing Role of Social Sciences in 
Shaping the Law, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2002) (discussing industry’s lobby efforts).  
 15. 11 U.S.C. § 707 (2000). Section 707(b) of the Code contains the means test, a long and 
complex formula used to determine whether a consumer debtor is eligible for Chapter 7 discharge. 
Generally speaking, consumer debtors with $167 per month of disposable income are presumed to be 
ineligible for Chapter 7. Unless those debtors rebut that presumption, they must convert to Chapter 13 
or 11, or have their cases dismissed. For a detailed description of the operation of the means test, see 
Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the Means Test the Only 
Way? 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665 (2005).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/7
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The four dissenting members of the Commission wrote extensive 
reports expressing their disagreements with the Commission’s consumer 
bankruptcy recommendations.16 The dissenters urged Congress to 
implement the means test for bankruptcy relief because relief currently 
was “too easy to obtain,” had “become a first resort rather than a last 
measure for people who cannot keep up with their bills,” and because “the 
moral stigma once attached to bankruptcy has eroded.”17 Since bankruptcy 
filings had increased from 287,570 in 1980 to 1,350,118 when the Report 
was issued in 1997,18 the consumer credit lobby embraced—and, perhaps, 
solicited—these dissenting views.19 Having “lost” the battle to institute the 
means test for bankruptcy before the Commission, the consumer credit 
lobby then turned their sights on Congress. 
B. Legislative Process 
Before the Commission’s Report was even formally filed, the 
consumer credit lobby attacked the Commission’s findings20 and found 
supporters in the 105th Congress to introduce legislation that advanced the 
dissenting Commissioner’s views. For example, a bipartisan House bill, 
which had 185 co-sponsors, substantially adopted the dissenting 
Commissioners’ views.21 The bill was designed to prevent debtors from 
receiving a Chapter 7 discharge unless they “passed” a formulaic test 
which proved that they did not have the means to repay a substantial 
portion of some of their debts.22 Likewise, the day after the Commission 
issued its Report, the Senate introduced bipartisan consumer bankruptcy 
legislation that also included a means test, albeit a more liberal one than 
 
 
 16. Edith H. Jones & James I. Shepard, Recommendations for Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy 
Law by Four Dissenting Commissioners, in REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW 
COMMISSION, Ch. 5, 3 (1997). 
 17. Id. at 2. 
 18. See American Bankruptcy Institute, Annual Business and Non-Business Filings by Year 
(1980–2006), available at http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home& 
TEMPLATE =/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=35631.  
 19. See Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANK. L.J. 
483, 496 (1997) (description by the Commission Reporter of the consumer credit industry lobbying 
efforts before the Commission); and Warren, The Market for Data, supra note 14, at 9–10. 
 20. See Rodney Ho, Bankruptcy Panel’s Ideas Anger Creditors, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1997, at 
A2. 
 21.  Responsible Borrower Protection Bankruptcy Act, H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997). 
 22. Id. § 101(4). See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through 
the News Media, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1091, 1098 (2004) (tracking the progress of the proposed House 
and Senate bills which limited access to consumer bankruptcy and effectively preempted the findings 
of the Bankruptcy Commission). 
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the one contained in the House bill.23 These early bipartisan bills, like 
those introduced in later sessions, all attempted to measure when a 
potential debtor should be deemed to have sufficient disposable income to 
repay some of his or her debts in the future.24 In addition to including a 
Chapter 7 means test, various bills required Chapter 13 debtors to devote 
more of their income to debt repayment,25 extended the length of time 
higher income debtors would have to repay their debts,26 and increased the 
number of debts that would be non-dischargeable in Chapter 13.27 The 
substance of the bills changed over time. The normative underpinning, that 
bankruptcy laws should discourage people from getting into debt and then 
attempting to discharge those debts in bankruptcy, did not.  
When Congress first voted on the legislation, the bills passed by 
overwhelming margins in both the House and Senate.28 Since the country 
was experiencing a period of strong economic growth, it was not terribly 
surprising that Congress would support the legislation. Yet, even in later 
sessions when economic growth slowed considerably, members in both 
the House and Senate—Democratic and Republican, liberal and 
conservative—still voted overwhelmingly in favor of the legislation.29 As 
discussed in the next section, the reasons supporters gave for their support 
of the legislation are substantially similar to the reasons the dissenting 
Commissioners listed as problems with the Report’s recommendations on 
consumer bankruptcy reform. Assuming at least some members of 
Congress genuinely believed those reasons, many in Congress appeared to 
 
 
 23. Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997, S. 1301, 105th Cong. § 102 (1997). The Act was 
sponsored by a Democratic and Republican senator. 
 24.  H.R. 2500, supra note 21, § 101(3); S. 1301, supra note 23, § 102. 
 25. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 102 (1998). 
 26. Id. § 410. 
 27. Id. §§ 141, 142, 145. 
 28.  Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 512–15 (2005) (tracing the progression of the bills 
during the multi-year process and noting that the first House and Senate bills passed by votes of 306–
118, and 97–1, respectively). 
 29. Id. Although the bill garnered the support of a substantial number of Democrats and 
Republicans in Congress, virtually all bankruptcy and commercial law professors at all major U.S. law 
schools (including this author), all major non-partisan national bankruptcy organizations, and the 
national organization of bankruptcy judges argued that the bill was ill-conceived, poorly drafted, and 
appeared to benefit only the credit card lobby.  
You are hard pressed to find a bankruptcy judge that supports this legislation. You are hard 
pressed to find a bankruptcy law professor, a bankruptcy expert of any kind, anywhere, any 
place in the U.S.A. that backs this bill. This bill was written for the lender. It is that simple. 
147 CONG. REC. 13129, 13140 (2001) (statement of Sen. Wellstone). These groups had little influence 
during the legislative process, in sharp contrast to the role they played in debates over bankruptcy laws 
in the 1970s and 1980s. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
IN AMERICA 141 (2001). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/7
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support the legislation because they supported the philosophical 
underpinnings of the legislation, i.e., that people need to understand they 
have a moral obligation to do whatever it takes to repay their debts.30 
1. Justifications for Legislation 
Throughout the time the bankruptcy legislation was pending before 
Congress, the bill’s supporters argued that consumers were improperly 
using bankruptcy laws as a form of debt management and that too many 
people filed for bankruptcy as a first, not last, resort.31 Members of 
Congress,32 political organizations,33 and industry witnesses who testified 
in support of the legislation34 insisted that people who could afford to 
 
 
 30. See 151 CONG. REC. S1820 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Sessions) (“When a 
person in America undertakes an obligation to pay someone, they ought pay them . . . . We are drifting 
a bit far to suggest there is no real obligation to pay the debts we incur. If we get to that point, then we 
have eroded some very important fundamental moral principles about commerce in America.”); G. 
Jeffrey MacDonald, The Moral Burden of Bankruptcy, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Jul. 3, 2006), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0703/p13s01-lire.html (quoting Christian personal finance “guru” 
Mary Hunt who stated that “[bankruptcy is] absolutely legal, but it is not moral.”). 
 31. See 151 CONG. REC. E737 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2005) (statement of Rep. Tiahrt) (“[T]he 
United States cannot afford to continue down the path where high consumer debt is routinely directed 
toward bankruptcy as a first stop rather than a last resort.”); 149 CONG. REC. H1991, H1998 (daily ed. 
Mar. 19, 2003) (statement of Rep. Davis) (“Rather than an action of last resort, [bankruptcy] had 
evolved into a convenient vehicle to discharge debts through irresponsible financial practices.”); 147 
CONG. REC. 2545, 2551 (2001) (statement of Rep. Boucher) (“Bankruptcy was never meant to be a 
financial planning tool, but it is increasingly becoming a first stop rather than a last resort . . . .”); 146 
CONG. REC. 22360, 22367 (2000) (statement of Rep. Bryant) (“In recent years, bankruptcy has truly 
become a first stop rather than a last resort.”); 144 CONG. REC. 20650, 20662 (1998) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch) (“Bankruptcy has become a routine financial planning device used to unload inconvenient 
debts, rather than a last resort for people who truly need it.”). 
 32. See 151 CONG. REC. S2199 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Frist) (“The bill 
before us establishes a means test based on a simple, fair principle: those who have the means should 
repay their debts.”); 145 CONG. REC. 8509, 8580 (1999) (statement of Rep. DeLay) (“Mr. Chairman, 
the bankruptcy bill under consideration today is based on the premise that those debtors who can 
afford to repay their debt should do so, rather than have it forgiven. To accomplish this seemingly 
simple goal, an income-based means test is employed to determine if a debtor could do one of three 
things: have debt forgiven; reorganize and enter into a repayment plan; or refrain from filing for 
bankruptcy at all.”); 144 CONG. REC. 21594, 21643 (1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“The fact is 
that some people use bankruptcy as a convenient financial planning tool to skip out on debts they 
could repay.”). 
 33. The “New Democrats” strongly supported the bankruptcy legislation. See Press Release, New 
Democrat Coalition, New Democrats Provide Key Support for Bankruptcy Reform (Mar. 1, 2001), 
available at http://www.dlc.org/print.cfm?contentid=3111 (last visited Jan. 5, 2007). The movement 
consisted of federal, state, and local elected officials—including Democratic members of the House 
and Senate. See Democrat Leadership Council, About the New Democrat Movement (June 1, 1998), 
http://www.dlc.org/print.cfm?contentid=894 (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).  
 34. See The Increase in Personal Bankruptcy and the Crisis in Consumer Credit; Hearing before 
the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 50 
(1997) (statement of Michael F. McEneney, on behalf of National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition) 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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repay their bills (the “can-pays”) should not be allowed to discharge their 
debts without first attempting to repay at least some of them. Supporters 
frequently referenced the skyrocketing filing rates during times of 
economic prosperity to prove that people were using the bankruptcy 
system opportunistically.35 
Legislative and industry supporters of the legislation also argued that 
lax bankruptcy laws had raised the cost of credit for hardworking 
Americans who were having financial difficulties but chose not to file for 
bankruptcy. The bill’s supporters, citing data initially presented to the 
Commission, contended that the increased bankruptcy filing rates imposed 
a $300–$400 tax on each American family.36 Supporters routinely stated, 
in testimony provided before Congress and in advertisements placed in 
major news outlets,37 that the dramatic increase in bankruptcy filings 
forced creditors to increase the cost of credit for everyone—including poor 
or working-class people who were diligently trying to pay their debts.38 
 
 
(“[T]he consumer bankruptcy system this year will provide billions of dollars of relief to debtors 
without ever asking the question whether those debtors even need the relief.”). According to the 
McEneney Prepared Statement, the National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition “is comprised of the 
American Bankers Association, America’s Community Bankers, American Financial Services 
Association, Consumer Bankers Association, Credit Union National Association, Independent Bankers 
Association of America, MasterCard International Incorporated, National Retail Federation and VISA 
U.S.A. Inc.” Id. at 51 n.1. 
 35. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 5 (2005) [hereinafter House Report] (“[T]he present bankruptcy 
system has loopholes and incentives that allow and—sometimes—even encourage opportunistic 
personal filings and abuse.”); H.R. REP. NO. 107-3(1), at 5 (2001); H.R. REP. NO. 105-540, at 54–55 
(1998); 144 CONG. REC. 24926, 25937 (1998) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (“The loopholes in our 
bankruptcy laws have led to a 400 percent increase in personal bankruptcy filings since 1980 at a cost 
of $40 billion per year. . . . Under the current system, some irresponsible people filing for bankruptcy 
run up their credit card debt immediately prior to filing knowing that their debts will soon be wiped 
away.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Jones & Shepard, supra note 13, at 10 (1997) (citing Report of SMR Research 
Corp., The Personal Bankruptcy Crisis, 1997, at 22). At times, the tax was reported to be even higher 
than $400. See 151 CONG. REC. S2308 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“It has 
become an economic problem where the average person in America is paying an additional $550 for 
goods and services because somebody else did not pay their bills.”); 151 CONG. REC. H1993, H2058 
(daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Chabot) (arguing in the same speech that personal 
bankruptcies impose a $500 per family annual tax and a $600 per family tax); 149 CONG. REC. H1991, 
H1996 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2003) (statement of Rep. Hart) (“The average American family pays more 
than $500 a year in increased prices as a result of unpaid debt. It is unfair to force responsible 
Americans to pay that premium.”).  
 37. As part of its public relations/lobbying efforts, the consumer credit industry placed 
advertisements in Roll Call, Congress Daily, and national newspapers. See Lisa Fickenscher, 
Bankruptcies Down; Enthusiasm for Reform Wanes, 188 AM. BANKER 1 (1999). 
 38. See Richard Jones, We All End Up Paying for Unfair Bankruptcy Laws, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 
6, 1997, at A16; Lax Bankruptcy Laws Make Everyone Pay, USA TODAY, June 12, 1997, at 14A; 
Aaron Zitner, Battle Brews Over Laws on Bankruptcy; Consumers, Lenders Await Report, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Oct. 17, 1997, at A1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/7
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The existing bankruptcy laws needed to be revised to stem the dramatic 
increase in bankruptcy filings, to prevent financially solvent people from 
opportunistically abusing bankruptcy laws, and to “repeal” the $400 tax 
that these debtors inadvertently imposed on honest, hardworking 
citizens.39 
However, even the legislation’s most ardent supporters recognized that 
certain people were undeniably “deserving” of a quick discharge of their 
debts in Chapter 7. These presumptively deserving debtors were people 
who became indebted for reasons beyond their control, specifically those 
with catastrophic medical expenses, those on active duty military service, 
and veterans who became disabled while performing military (or 
homeland defense) duties.40 All other debtors (presumptively non-
deserving debtors) generally should be forced to prove that they need a 
fresh start. The proof, supporters urged, could be established only by 
utilizing a formulaic analysis of their income and expenses, i.e., a means 
test.41 
Using a formulaic test to determine eligibility was justified in part 
because some supporters recoiled at the view that a bankruptcy discharge 
was just another governmental benefit or bailout.42 In effect, just as 
Congress had previously concluded that people who receive other types of 
public assistance—such as food stamps or Temporary Assistance for 
 
 
 39. House Report, supra note 35, at 4 (asserting the existence of a “bankruptcy tax”); 151 CONG. 
REC. S2199 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Frist); Democratic Leadership Council, 
Modernizing Bankruptcy Law (Mar. 20, 1998), http://www.dlc.org/print.cfm?contentid=2647 (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2007) (arguing that opportunistic bankruptcies were skyrocketing while “the ‘little guy’ 
pays more at the cash register—an estimated $400 per family each year—for retail goods to offset 
bankruptcy related losses, and also, ironically, gets reduced access to credit from bankruptcy-wary 
lenders.”).  
 40. See 151 CONG. REC. E704 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2005) (statement of Rep. Moore) (noting that 
S. 256 properly allows “bankruptcy filers to challenge the means test by demonstrating ‘special 
circumstances,’ such as a serious medical condition, that justify additional expenses or adjustments to 
their income.”). See also 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i), (b)(2)(D) (2000) (codification of protections for 
deserving debtors). 
 41.  See 151 CONG. REC. H1993, H2053 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 2005) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) 
(“The means test applies clear and well-defined standards to determine whether a debtor has the 
financial capability to pay his or her debts. The application of such objective standards will help ensure 
that the fresh start provisions of Chapter VII will be granted to those who need them, while debtors 
that can afford to repay some of their debts are steered toward filing chapter 13 bankruptcies.”). 
 42. See 149 CONG. REC. H1961 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2003) (statement of Rep. Miller) (“The 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection of 2003 holds people accountable for their 
personal spending habits. If a person has debts and dissolves under Chapter 7, but have [sic] sufficient 
funds to pay off their debt, then clearly they should be required to pay it off, not to have their debt 
whisked painlessly away by just filing bankruptcy. In my opinion, the Federal Government should not 
be in the business of bailing people out of their debt.”). See also SKEEL, supra note 29 (noting that 
bankruptcy laws that allowed corporate reorganizations were implemented during the New Deal 
process of creating social safety nets). 
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Needy Families (TANF)—must prove that they “deserve” to receive those 
forms of relief, Congress determined that people who seek a discharge of 
their debts also must prove their eligibility.43  
2. Opposition to Legislation 
Opponents of the reform legislation repeatedly stressed that the 
legislation was unnecessary and was being considered only at the behest of 
the credit card industry.44 The opponents decried the powerful special 
interest group’s influence and asserted that Congress was captured by the 
credit card lobby. Moreover, opponents relied on a massive amount of 
empirical data to bolster their contention that a means test was 
unnecessary because the vast majority of people who filed for bankruptcy 
were in financial distress and simply lacked the means to repay their 
debts.45  
Opponents of the legislation also disputed that existing bankruptcy 
laws imposed costs on people who were struggling to pay their debts but 
did not file for bankruptcy.46 They characterized the $400 bankruptcy tax 
as a phantom tax, often stressing the lack of data to support the claim and 
 
 
 43. Moreover, just as it was easy to garner wide, bipartisan, and public support for welfare 
reform legislation that prevented the undeserving welfare queen from milking the system, it was easy 
for legislators to support the bankruptcy legislation once they characterized it as yet another bloated 
government program that was being abused by people with means. See A. Mechele Dickerson, 
America’s Uneasy Relationship With the Working Poor, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 17, 29, 65–66 (1999); 
Democratic Leadership Council, Modernizing Bankruptcy Law, supra note 39 (“Like ‘affluence tests’ 
for federal benefits, which New Democrats typically support, a needs-based bankruptcy system is a 
way to ensure that the protection of the federal ‘safety net’ extends only so far as it is actually 
needed.”). See generally, Elizabeth Warren, What is a Women’s Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, 
and Other Gender-Neutral Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19, 52–53 (2002) (arguing that women 
may have failed to vigorously oppose the pending legislation because they viewed bankruptcy as part 
of the larger debate about the need to decrease the expanding economic role of the government). 
 44. 151 CONG. REC. S1818 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (noting that the 
reason the bill is being considered is because “the credit card industry and big banks want this 
bill . . .”); 145 CONG. REC. 28677, 28693 (1999) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (noting that the 
consumer credit industry “has pushed and pushed and pushed for this bill . . .”). 
 45. While BAPCPA supporters argued that at least ten percent of the debtors were can-pays, 
opponents contended that the number was (and is) lower. 151 CONG. REC. S1823 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 
2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (citing research of nonpartisan American Bankruptcy Institute that 
indicated three percent of people could afford to repay some of their bills). See generally, Teresa A. 
Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 238–
39 n.75 (2006) (discussing ten percent figure estimation). See also Marianne M. Culhane & Michaela 
M. White, Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real 
Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 27, 31 (2005) (estimating the figure at 3.6 percent). 
 46.  See Elizabeth Warren, The Phantom $400, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 77 (2004) (tracking the 
credit industry’s strategic promotion of the idea that the current bankruptcy laws were expensive for all 
of society).  
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citing empirical studies that proved that no such tax existed.47 They also 
cited data that challenged the argument that this tax increased the cost of 
credit to non-filing consumers, specifically noting that credit card issuers 
did not lower interest rates or otherwise pass on cost savings to customers 
in the years when bankruptcy filings decreased.48 Likewise, opponents 
relied on data that indicated that even as the number of bankruptcies rose, 
credit card earnings remained high (and, at times, were higher than those 
of commercial banks).49 
3. Legislative Disconnect  
The legislative debates were dominated by arguments over how best to 
design a formula that determines who is a can-pay debtor and whether—
based on that formula—there are many, or just a few, can-pays.50 While 
supporters claimed that a means test was needed because people who 
could afford to pay their debts were choosing to discharge them in 
bankruptcy, opponents cited empirical data to prove that the vast majority 
of people who filed for bankruptcy were in financial distress and lacked 
the means to repay any meaningful part of their debts.51 Unfortunately, 
throughout the legislative process, the legislation’s supporters and 
opponents failed to agree on certain normative principles and, because of 
that, largely talked past each other.52  
 
 
 47. See 151 CONG. REC. H1993, H2050 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Delahunt) 
(“The figure of $400 is a mythical figure. It is inaccurate.”); Jensen, supra note 28, at 489 n.19 
(quoting president of research group that provided the $400 tax figure who conceded that the figure 
given for the overall consumer debt in the country, from which the $400 number was calculated, was a 
rough estimate); Warren, supra note 46 (attacking credibility of the existence of the $400 tax); Warren, 
The Market for Data, supra note 19, at 13–20 (same).  
 48. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The Profitability of Credit Card 
Operations of Depository Institutions 2 (June 2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ 
rptcongress/creditcard/2005/ccprofit.pdf; See Robert Lawless, Testimony before the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary (Dec. 6, 2006), http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2442&wit_id=5936.  
 49. Warren, The Market for Data, supra note 14, at 12. Even though the number of bankruptcy 
filings has dropped significantly since BAPCPA’s effective date, the credit card industry has not 
lowered interest rates on credit cards, the industry has increased credit card fees, and credit card 
defaults are at the same level they were in 2004 (though the filing rate is less than half the 2004 filing 
rate). See Robert Lawless, Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 48; 
Posting of Elizabeth Warren to Credit Slips, Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Card Losses, 
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2006/12/bankruptcy_refo.html (Dec. 11, 2006, 9:03 p.m.).  
 50. 151 CONG. REC. S2459, 2459 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Most of 
our debate on this bill has focused around the means test.”). 
 51. Jensen, supra note 28, at 498–500 (describing witnesses and testimony presented at House 
bankruptcy hearings). 
 52. See 151 CONG. REC. S1819 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (“Supporters 
of this bill say you are either with them or with the bad guys, the chiselers, the cheaters, the grafters, 
the drifters, the people they say are trying to game the system of bankruptcy . . . .”); Elizabeth Warren, 
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For example, the opponents relied on data that proved that the 
bankruptcy filing rate increased because of increased financial distress.53 
However, this data could not disprove the supporters’ claim that relaxed 
bankruptcy laws facilitated the financial distress by encouraging people to 
become overindebted. Perhaps more importantly, the data could not prove 
whether debtors lacked the ability to alleviate that distress by taking a 
second or third job, shopping at secondhand or discount stores, moving in 
with friends/family, eliminating all recreational spending (like birthday or 
holiday gifts), pawning their electronic equipment, etc. Similarly, 
opponents argued that most debtors filed for bankruptcy because of 
expenses they incurred after they lost a job or got divorced.54 Even 
assuming that this is true, the data was not convincing to legislators who 
did not make distinctions between the type of relief that should be given to 
presumptively deserving debtors—those who filed for medical reasons or 
other catastrophic factors—and those who filed because they chose to 
overspend—even if the “choice” was made after the debtor got divorced or 
lost his or her job.55  
Supporters of the legislation frequently cited examples of profligate 
debtors who purchased luxurious items yet appeared to have no intention 
of repaying their creditors or who simply refused to curb their extravagant 
lifestyles and sell their expensive homes, boats, cars, etc.56 However, 
 
 
The Changing Politics of American Bankruptcy Reform, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 189, 201 (1999) 
(characterizing the debate as “little more than a caricature of a discussion about what was, and what 
was not, right about the existing consumer bankruptcy system. The complex and textured decisions 
needed to form the core of the bankruptcy system gave way to meaningless phrases and name-
calling.”). 
 53. See generally Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 45, at 233 (discussing data that 
refute the suggestion that the increase was fueled by “less-indebted people filing for bankruptcy”).  
 54.  151 CONG. REC. H1979 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Scott) (“While some 
who file bankruptcy have been financially irresponsible, the overwhelming majority of those who file 
do so as a result of divorce, major illness, or job loss. Half of those who go into bankruptcy do so 
because of illness, and most of them had health insurance but still could not pay their bills.”). 
 55. Id. (“If the purpose of the legislation is to try to deal with those who abuse credit, we ought to 
be able to distinguish them from the hard-working Americans who unfortunately become ill, those 
who have an unforeseen loss of job, or whose spouses desert them after a business failure.”). I realize 
that the concept of choice or free will is controversial in this context. Most would understand why a 
recently unemployed or divorced debtor, or one who had an unexpected short-term illness, would use a 
credit card to make ends meet. It is unclear, however, whether such a debtor wanted to become 
overindebted or, instead, that the debtor chose overindebtedness over an unacceptable alternative like 
homelessness, starvation, prostituting themselves, selling internal organs, and the like. See generally 
YVES R. SIMON, FREEDOM OF CHOICE 17–21 (Peter Wolff ed., 1969). 
 56. 151 CONG. REC. S1818 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (citing examples 
of Bowie Kuhn and Burt Reynolds as high-income debtors who gamed the system). See Lucile P. 
Beckwith, President/CEO, Palmetto Trust Federal Credit Union, Testimony Before the House 
Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. On Commercial and Administrative Law (Mar. 4, 2003), 2003 WL 
876584 (F.D.C.H.); John J. Gleason, Vice President of Credit, The Bon-Ton Department Stores (on 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/7
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supporters failed to clearly explain whether any distinction should be 
made between debtors who became overindebted because of abusive (i.e., 
extravagant, illegal, or fraudulent) conduct and those who chose to 
overspend because they became unemployed, had higher living expenses 
after they got divorced, or found themselves saddled with a former (or 
deceased) spouse’s debts.57 Finally, supporters of the legislation never 
discussed the level of personal sacrifice overindebted people should make 
to get out of debt—for instance, move in with family, switch to unlicensed 
and cheaper day care arrangements, remove children from parochial 
schools, etc.—or how much human capital financially strapped people 
should be expected to devote to digging themselves out of debt. 
4. Areas of Agreement 
Despite bitter disputes, there was remarkable agreement among 
supporters and opponents of the bankruptcy legislation over key factual 
matters. Significantly, they agreed that at least some debtors tried to game 
the system or otherwise abused bankruptcy laws by intentionally incurring 
debts which they then refused to attempt to repay even though they had the 
means to do so.58 They agreed that these clearly undeserving debtors 
should be denied relief in Chapter 7. They further agreed that there were 
some problems with the consumer bankruptcy system specifically, and 
with consumer credit decisions generally.59 In addition, no one disputed 
 
 
behalf of the National Retail Federation), Testimony Before the H. Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. of 
Commercial and Admin. Law (Mar. 10, 1998), 1998 WL 879900 (F.D.C.H.).  
 57. See House Report, supra note 35, at 597 (additional dissenting views) (“If the purpose of this 
legislation is to try to deal with spendthrifts and those who are abusers of credit, we ought to be able to 
distinguish them from hard-working Americans who unfortunately became ill, those who have had an 
unforeseen change in their employment, and those whose spouses experienced business failures. 
Unfortunately, this legislation does not make those distinctions.”); 151 CONG. REC. H1974, H1976 
(daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (listing proposed, and rejected, amendment by Rep. Scott that would exempt 
debtors who have business losses incurred by a spouse who has died or deserted the debtor from the 
bill’s means test provisions). 
 58.  For a statement made by a supporter of the legislation, see 147 CONG. REC. 2545, 2627 
(2001) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (“Under the current system, some irresponsible people filing for 
bankruptcy run up their credit card debt immediately prior to filing, knowing that their debts will soon 
be wiped away.”). For statements made by an opponent of the legislation, see 151 CONG. REC. S1818 
(daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (citing examples of Bowie Kuhn and Burt 
Reynolds as high income debtors who gamed the system); 146 CONG. REC. 26447, 26492 (2000) 
(statement of Sen. Kerry) (“I am among those who believe that, too often, bankruptcy is used as an 
economic tool to avoid responsibility for unsound decisions and reckless spending.”).  
 59. For statements by supporters of the bill, see 150 CONG. REC. H148, H149 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 
2004) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (“The Justice Department reports that debtors are obtaining 
credit cards despite having little or no income, incurring huge debts, paying those debts with worthless 
checks, and then filing for bankruptcy relief to discharge their massive liabilities.”); 145 CONG. REC. 
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that bankruptcy filings increased (by more than sixty percent) from 1987 
to 1997 and that a significant number of consumers had taken on too much 
debt.60  
Opponents and supporters also agreed that opportunistic debtor conduct 
alone could not explain all consumer bankruptcy filings. Thus, all agreed 
that medical debts or other catastrophes force some people into bankruptcy 
and that those people deserve to discharge their debts.61 Opponents and 
supporters likewise agreed that most consumers lacked the ability to 
understand the disclosures they received from their credit card companies 
and that this inability may account for some unwise credit card 
decisions.62 Indeed, although the legislative process was protracted and 
controversial, the large areas of agreement may explain why the legislation 
always enjoyed bipartisan support63 and why, from 199864 to 2005 (the 
 
 
28957, 28990 (1999) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“Bankruptcy relief should be available to people who 
work hard and play by rules, yet fall unexpectedly upon hard times. Perpetrators of fraud should not be 
allowed to find safe haven in the bankruptcy code.”). For a statement made by an opponent of the bill, 
see 149 CONG. REC. H1991, H1996 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2003) (statement of Rep. Watt) (“I was among 
the people who was the first to concede that there was a problem in the bankruptcy system.”).  
 60. For a comment made by one of the bill’s opponents, see 144 CONG. REC. 8445, 8448 (1998) 
(statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (“[A]bout 1.4 million families will file for consumer bankruptcy, a 
rise of about 400 percent since 1980. Virtually all independent academic study and all government 
studies of the increase in bankruptcy demonstrate that the rise in bankruptcy filings follows equally 
sharp rises in the amount of consumer debt per household.”). For a similar statement made by one of 
the bill’s strongest supporters, see 151 CONG. REC. S1834, S1842 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement 
of Sen. Hatch) (“Bankruptcies doubled in the 1980s. They doubled again from 1990 to 2003. In 2004 
alone, there were 1.6 million more bankruptcies than during the entire Great Depression . . . . 
Certainly, one of the critical reasons behind the rising tide of filings under the Bankruptcy Code, as 
years of study document, are the actions of those who flagrantly abuse our generous bankruptcy 
laws.”). 
 61. For comments made by one of the bill’s strongest supporters, see 144 CONG. REC. 19500, 
19501 (1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“Let me start out by saying there is some justification for 
bankruptcy. People hurt by natural disasters, catastrophic illness, divorce, etc., are entitled to a new 
start.”). For similar remarks made by an opponent of the bill, see 147 CONG. REC. 3737, 3758 (2001) 
(statement of Sen. Kerry) (“At the same time, we must not forget that a fresh start in bankruptcy serves 
a valuable purpose for many individuals who truly need its protections. When an individual gets into 
financial trouble because, for example, she has catastrophic, unforeseen medical expenses, it is better 
for her, for her creditors and even for society as a whole if she is given the opportunity to have her 
debts discharged and is given a fresh start.”). 
 62. For a comment made by a supporter, see 151 CONG. REC. S1726, 1781 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 
2005) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“Currently, credit card statements fail to include all of the 
information necessary to allow individuals to make fully informed financial decisions. Additional 
disclosure is needed to ensure that individuals completely understand the implications of their credit 
card use.”). For a comment made by an opponent, see 146 CONG. REC. S11626 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 
2000) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (“The number of people who end up overextending on credit cards 
and finding they cannot meet their obligations include quite a few who never understood the terms and 
conditions of their credit card arrangement.”). 
 63. See House Report, supra note 35, at 6. See generally Jacoby, supra note 22, at 1098–1106 
(discussing bills before the 105th through 107th Congresses). At one point, members of the New 
Democrat Coalition co-sponsored the legislation. Press Release, New Democrat Coalition, New 
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year BAPCPA finally was enacted), it almost passed one or both chambers 
each year by veto-proof margins.65  
III. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY  
Given the consumer credit industry’s influence during the bankruptcy 
reform legislative process, it is understandable that many view the 
BAPCPA story as a classic example of vote-buying by the consumer credit 
industry. Yet, if this is true, one is left to wonder why it took almost a 
decade for the legislation to pass. Further, if BAPCPA was bought and 
paid for by the credit card industry, then one reasonably could assume that 
the bill would be narrowly tailored to protect that industry’s financial 
interests. As the next Part explains in more detail, telling the BAPCPA 
story as one that involves multiple special interest groups and their 
intergroup conflicts provides a fuller explanation of the legislative process 
and also explains why the credit card industry might not have received the 
bill some argue it “bought.” 
A. Public Choice Theory Generally 
The BAPCPA story of vote-buying by the consumer credit lobby is 
told from the perspective of public choice theory. Public choice theory 
generally posits that political actors will behave in a self-interested fashion 
 
 
Democrats Provide Key Support for Bankruptcy Reform (Mar. 1, 2003), available at http://www. 
dlc.org/print.cfm?contentid=3111 (last visited Jan. 5, 2007). 
 64. The Senate passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998), 
which included means testing, by a vote of 97–1. 144 CONG. REC. 21594, 21623 (1998). The only 
senator who voted against the bill was Senator Paul Wellstone. The House passed the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998) by a vote of 306–118. 144 CONG. REC. 11918, 
11960 (1998). Many view the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 as the foundation for BAPCPA. See 
Jensen, supra note 28, at 496.  
 65. Both the Senate and House passed legislation in 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2005. The House 
passed legislation by veto-proof margins in 2003 and 2004. For example, the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1999, H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (2000) and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, S. 625, 106th Cong. 
(1999) produced a conference report that became H.R. 2415. Both the House (by a voice vote), 146 
CONG. REC. H9840 (2000), and the Senate (by a vote of 70–28), 146 CONG. REC. S11730 (2000), 
passed this bill, but then-President Clinton pocket vetoed the legislation citing concerns of the 
omission of a homestead cap and the abortion clinic language. Similarly, the House passed the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001), 
by a vote of 306 (which included all Republicans) to 108 (with 93 Democrats voting in favor of the 
bill). 147 CONG. REC. H600–01 (2001). The Senate passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 
220, 107th Cong. (2001) by an 82–16 vote (with all Republicans except 1, and 35 Democrats 
supporting the bill). 147 CONG. REC. S7742 (2001). A conference report was prepared, but it 
ultimately was rejected by the House because of language relating to a provision involving the 
discharge of abortion protest debts.  
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and that their decisions will be influenced by small, organized, single-
issue special interest groups.66 Specifically, politicians are said to sell their 
votes to special interest groups in return for votes, campaign contributions, 
promises for future favors, or illegal bribes.67 This theory predicts that 
rational, self-interested politicians will listen to constituents because they 
need their votes and to wealthy lobbying groups because they need their 
campaign contributions. Public choice theory has most often been used to 
explain political decisions: that are narrow, technical and do not have high 
public visibility; where the cost to transfer wealth to the interest group is 
widely disbursed among a larger group; where the politician does not 
believe that his constituency will care about the law in question; and 
where the law is consistent with the legislator's own ideology.68  
The research of some social scientists and legal scholars (especially 
their empirical research) refutes many of the early presumptions 
underlying public choice theory. These scholars dispute that politicians 
routinely “sell” their votes and that a single interest group can influence a 
legislative decision.69 Although these critics concede that interest groups 
play a central role in legislative decisionmaking, they suggest that 
politicians are motivated by three main factors: their desire to be reelected, 
their personal beliefs, and the short-term influence of special interest 
groups.70 Thus, even where special interest groups contribute significantly 
to legislators’ campaigns, critics of public choice theory posit that the 
outcome of the legislation will be influenced by the legislators’ desire not 
to alienate constituents who may oppose the bill.71 Because of these 
potentially conflicting constituent group interests, public choice critics 
argue that it is simply incorrect to suggest that one interest group is 
capable of controlling legislator conduct since legislators (as agents) have 
multiple interest groups (their principals) to consider when deciding 
whether to support legislation.72 
 
 
 66. Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 86 
(1990) (tracing the history of public choice theory). See also Warren, supra note 43, at 44 (arguing 
that the consumer credit lobby was effective because it spent “more money on fewer issues” than other 
organized groups). 
 67. See Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. 
REV. 873, 879 (1987) (citing William A. Landes & Richard A. Posner. The Independent Judiciary in 
an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975)). 
 68. Hovenkamp, supra note 66, at 88. 
 69. Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative 
Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
 70. See id. 
 71. Farber & Frickey, supra note 67, at 889–90; Hovenkamp, supra note 66, at 89.  
 72. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public 
Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123, 144–45 (1989). 
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B. BAPCPA and Public Choice Theory 
The popular media,73 academic commentators,74 current and former 
bankruptcy judges,75 administrators in the bankruptcy system,76 and 
lawyers77 consistently painted the bankruptcy bills in narrow public choice 
terms that pitted the powerful credit card industry against poor, largely 
defenseless debtors. In addition to direct campaign contributions and 
contributions to political action committees,78 the industry was said to 
influence legislators indirectly through an orchestrated public relations 
 
 
 73. See Jacoby, supra note 22, at 1120–25 (chronicling news reports of the credit industry’s 
influence); Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Soaked by Congress, TIME, May 15, 2000, at 64. 
 74. See Jean Braucher, Consumer Bankruptcy As Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh Start or 
Treadmill?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1065, 1076–77 (2004) (remarking that the reform lobbied for 
by the credit card industry would likely make it unaffordable for debtors “who are the worst off”); 
Melissa B. Jacoby, The Bankruptcy Code at Twenty-Five and the Next Generation of Lawmaking, 78 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 224 (2004) (commenting that legislators may be “more receptive to the views of 
larger monetary contributors” than to the views expressed by academics, bankruptcy judges, or other 
bankruptcy experts); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States, 
18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 45 (2001) (noting that the bill was motivated by “huge campaign contributions 
to key congressmen by the consumer credit industry and intensive lobbying efforts by very influential 
lobbyists”).  
 75. William T. Bodoh & Lawrence P. Dempsey, Bankruptcy Reform: An Orderly Development 
of Public Policy?, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 191, 203 (2001) (noting the significant financial contributions 
made by the credit industry to those members of Congress with influence over bankruptcy reform); 
Keith M. Lundin, Ten Principles of BAPCPA: Not What Was Advertised, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 
2005, at 1, 1 (“[T]he coalition of consumer lenders driving this legislation won the public relations war 
for bankruptcy reform.”). The judicial criticisms of the bill have perhaps grown even louder since 
BAPCPA’s enactment. For instance, in In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113, 114 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005), the 
court stated that Congress  
did all in their power to avoid the proffered input from sitting United States Bankruptcy 
Judges, various professors of bankruptcy law at distinguished universities, and many 
professional associations filled with the best of the bankruptcy lawyers in the country as to 
the perceived flaws in the Act. This is because the parties pushing the passage of the Act had 
their own agenda . . . to make more money off the backs of the consumers in this country. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the Act has been highly criticized across the country. In this 
writer’s opinion, to call the Act a “consumer protection” Act is the grossest of misnomers. 
 76. Robert J. Landry, III, The Policy and Forces Behind Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: A 
Classic Battle Over Problem Definition, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 509, 510 (2003) (“The half-decade of 
heavy lobbying for reform was about to pay off.”).  
 77. Henry J. Sommer, Causes of the Consumer Bankruptcy Explosion: Debtor Abuse or Easy 
Credit?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 33, 43 (1998) (stating that the bankruptcy reform story is one “of 
money, power, and politics”); Catherine E. Vance & Paige Barr, The Facts & Fiction of Bankruptcy 
Reform, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 361, 367–68 (2003) (“[B]ankruptcy reform has been driven by a 
myopic focus on the banking industry’s story of the state of consumer bankruptcies and the millions of 
dollars that this same industry poured into politicians’ coffers.”).  
 78. For discussions of the campaign contributions the consumer credit lobby made during the 
multi-year legislative process, see generally Peter C. Alexander, “Herstory” Repeats: The Bankruptcy 
Code Harms Women and Children, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 571, 581 n.39 (2005); Edward J. 
Janger, The Locus of Lawmaking: Uniform State Law, Federal Law, and Bankruptcy Reform, 74 AM. 
BANKR. L. J. 97 (2000); Tabb, supra note 74, at 45–46. 
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campaign.79 Using public choice theory to tell the BAPCPA story is quite 
consistent with the ways in which the theory has been used to describe 
other narrow or technical laws.80 And, at least until the BAPCPA 
legislative process, bankruptcy laws did not have high public visibility, 
and most people probably never thought (or really cared) about bankruptcy 
laws. Perhaps the main reason, though, that many have critiqued the 
bankruptcy legislative process using public choice theory is because the 
process seemed so one-sided given the lack of organized opposition from 
the people most harmed by the legislation, i.e., “future” debtors.81  
There are a number of reasons why future debtors did not organize to 
aggressively lobby against the bill. Perhaps the largest impediment to 
organizing future debtors is that they are unidentifiable. Although past and 
present debtors can be identified by public court filings, there simply is no 
way to predict which consumer in financial distress will choose to file for 
bankruptcy and which will try to find another way to handle his financial 
situation.82 Further, organizing potential debtors is challenging because 
overindebted consumers will discount the likelihood that they might need 
to file for bankruptcy and would benefit from organizing to oppose the 
 
 
 79. Warren, supra note 43, at 45 (discussing consumer credit industry’s lobbying efforts); 
Roundtable Discussion, Bankruptcy Reform: Then and Now, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 299, 325 
(2004) [hereinafter Roundtable Discussion] (comments of Richard Levin, one of the principal authors 
of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code and former counsel to the Subcommittee of the House Judiciary 
Committee from 1975–1978, disputing that industry bought votes and suggesting that industry bought 
“sound bites”).  
 80. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative 
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 142–43 (1998) (noting that when rules become technical and are 
developed over multiple rounds, the meaningful participation of generally interested parties is 
effectively barred); Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 
HASTINGS L.J. 407, 443–44 (1999) (noting that tax lobbyists capitalize on the reality that legislators 
are unable to learn the complex details of the tax code). Examples in the Bankruptcy Code include the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, § 1102, 119 
Stat. 23, 189–90 (2005) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 351) (describing procedure to dispose of patient 
records in health care bankruptcy); 11 U.S.C. §§ 781–784 (2000) (describing procedures in clearing 
bank liquidations). 
 81.  Roundtable Discussion, supra note 79, at 312 (comment by USA Today reporter Christine 
Dugas, that “the bipartisan nature of the support, it seems to me, has more to do with the fact that the 
financial services industry has contributed so much to members, I don’t think debtors have anybody on 
their side making contributions to Congress”). 
 82. See Examining the Increase of Personal Bankruptcies and the Crisis in Consumer Credit: 
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 65 (1998) (statement of Michael F. McEneney, on behalf of National 
Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition) (stating that “many, many people who go bankrupt look just like 
those who never default . . .”). See generally RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD 200 (2006) 
(discussing whether borrowers or lenders are better situated to avoid financial distress and 
bankruptcy). 
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bankruptcy legislation.83 Moreover, it is difficult to organize future debtors 
because, unlike the consumer credit industry, their connection to 
bankruptcy and the reasons they filed for bankruptcy (reckless spending, 
military deployment, divorce, medical expenses, etc.) are diverse. 
Organizing the past, present, and future debtors of America also was not 
likely because of the stigma or shame associated with filing (or needing to 
file) for bankruptcy.84 Finally, as a practical matter, organizing people who 
are overindebted is virtually impossible because they do not have enough 
money to fund a successful lobbying effort. 
Even if there had been organized opposition from past, current, or 
future debtors, given the modern realities of the legislative process, the 
consumer credit industry still would have played a significant role in the 
legislative strategy involving bankruptcy reform. Stated more bluntly, that 
the bankruptcy bills initially were drafted (in part, if not wholly) by 
lobbyists may be unfortunate, but it is not unusual. Most businesses and 
industries directly influence the modern legislative process. They also 
exert less transparent forms of political influence by providing employees 
to testify before Congress, by employing former elected or appointed 
officials (or legislative staffers) once they leave office, and by providing 
corporate philanthropy.85 Indeed, it is commonly understood that private 
industry lobbyists have an active role in all substantive legislative areas, 
except perhaps those involving criminal laws.86 The significant role 
 
 
 83. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 269 (1997), stating: 
Just as many consumers may systematically underestimate the extent of their current and 
future credit card borrowing, it should be expected that many consumers may systematically 
underestimate (at the time they borrow) the probability with which they will eventually fall 
into bankruptcy. Many or most consumers will underestimate the likelihood that the technical 
rules of bankruptcy will apply to them, and hence they will underreact to changes in the 
bankruptcy law. 
See also Charles J. Tabb, Of Contractarians and Bankruptcy Reform: A Skeptical View, 12 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 259, 264 (2004) (noting that “[i]ndividual debtors are systematically biased to 
underestimate the chance that they will become insolvent”).  
 84. 151 CONG. REC. S2421 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (“People I have 
known who have gone through bankruptcy are not proudly announcing to their friends: Well, I had a 
great day in bankruptcy court. These are people who are a little embarrassed, a little ashamed of what 
they had to go through.”); Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma: Plausible Causes for Shifting Norms, 22 
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 481, 485–87 & nn.21–27 (2006).  
 85. See Scott H. Ainsworth, The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest Group 
Influence, 22 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 517, 521 (1997) (describing how lobbyists form long-term relationships 
with legislatures which enable the lobbyists to influence legislative strategy on many levels); Jill E. 
Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (2005) 
(discussing FedEx’s participation in the political process). 
 86. See Jensen, supra note 28, at 499 & n.84 (discussing reports that an attorney hired by a lobby 
for secured and unsecured creditors initially drafted legislation that ultimately served as the framework 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1861 Dickerson book pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1880 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1861 
 
 
 
 
lobbyists played during the multi-year process to enact the bankruptcy 
legislation may have been unusual because of the limited input from past, 
current, or future debtors87 and because some members of Congress 
appeared to take directions from the credit card lobby.88 Yet, legislative 
staffers89 and commentators on the legislative process alike agree that 
lobbyists have a strong influence on the text of bills introduced in 
Congress and that having lobbyists draft legislation is “a normal part of 
the drafting process.”90  
IV. BAPCPA AND MULTIPLE CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
During the bankruptcy legislation’s arduous multi-year march through 
Congress, critics of the legislation raised concerns about the effect that it 
would have on other politically influential (i.e., special interest) groups, 
notably women, retirees, and members of the armed forces.91 As discussed 
in the next section, although the first bankruptcy reform bills appear to 
have pitted the organized consumer credit lobby against unorganized 
consumers, concerns about the potential harm the bills would have on 
other interest groups forced congressional supporters of the bankruptcy 
bills to balance their desire to please the consumer credit industry against 
their desire not to alienate constituents who likely would be harmed by a 
completely pro-consumer-credit-industry bill. In the process, Congress 
amended earlier versions of the bankruptcy legislation in ways that 
ultimately harmed the consumer credit industry’s financial interests.92 
 
 
for bills introduced in Congress, including BAPCPA); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The 
Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 591 (2002) 
(reporting comments by legislative staffers of the Senate Judiciary Committee that suggested that the 
House bill was “negotiated and drafted by lobbyists and introduced with only ‘minor changes’”).  
 87. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 86, at 613 (“The bankruptcy bill is a poster child for what 
should not happen in Congress. Maybe when there are two opposing powerful [interest groups], you 
get a wash, but in the bankruptcy bill, there is a real imbalance [in money and firepower].”). 
 88. Id. (comment by legislative staffer of Senate Judiciary Committee that one member of 
Congress consulted with credit card lobby before making any decisions). See also H.R. REP. NO. 109-
31, at 386 (statement of Rep. Nadler) (“Yet here in Congress, the demands of the special interests who 
have a stake in some provision in this bill are generally viewed as a great idea that requires no further 
consideration.”). 
 89. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 86, at 583, 587 (noting uniform responses of legislative 
staffers indicating that lobbyists draft the text of bills in the Senate Judiciary Committee). 
 90. Id. at 610 (indicating belief of legislative staffers that lobbyists have expertise and can 
provide valuable information and practical experience concerning proposed legislation). See also 
Fisch, supra note 85, at 1508. 
 91. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 107-3, at 180–98 (2001) (statement of Prof. Karen Gross, New York 
Law School). 
 92. For example, from 1997 to 2005, the means test itself was progressively weakened. See 
Ronald J. Mann, supra note 14, at 383 (Table One). 
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Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that BAPCPA—as enacted—is not 
the bill the consumer credit industry lobbied for so strenuously for almost 
a decade.93  
A. Women 
Early in the legislative process, concerns were raised about the effect 
the legislation might have on women generally and ex-spouses 
specifically.94 Opponents of the legislation correctly surmised that the 
legislation’s supporters would be hesitant to support legislation that 
appeared to harm women or that helped deadbeat dads avoid paying their 
obligations to their former spouses or children.95 Of course, both men and 
women receive alimony, have custody of minor children, and can be the 
victims of domestic violence. The legislation’s opponents, however, 
almost always used gendered language when discussing the potentially 
harsh consequences the bill would have on support recipients and victims 
of domestic violence. In response, supporters went to great lengths to 
argue that the pending legislation helped women and children and they 
routinely sought to discredit opponents’ contentions that the bill harmed 
women.96  
Critics also charged that, even though most family support obligations 
already were nondischargeable and received priority payment,97 a law 
 
 
 93. Id. at 382–83 (relating discussions with executives at credit card issuers). 
 94. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, A Quiet Attack on Women, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2002, at 6 
(“Regardless of one’s views of the amendment, the bill itself is unconscionable. If it becomes law, the 
economic effects on more than 1.2 million women each year will be devastating.”); Elizabeth Warren, 
Editorial, Bankrupt? Pay Your Child Support First, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1998, at A15. 
 95. See 151 CONG. REC. S1820, S1856 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Grassley) 
(arguing that organizations charged with tracking down “deadbeat dads” supported BAPCPA).  
 96. Compare 146 CONG. REC. 26447, 26490 (2000) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (“The impact that 
this legislation would have on single-parent households is particularly disturbing to me. . . . [T]his 
change will inevitably lead to conflicts between commercial creditors and single parents who are owed 
support and alimony payments.”), and 147 CONG. REG. 2749, 2756 (2001) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy) (“We all know what happens when women and children are forced to compete for these 
scarce resources with these sophisticated lenders—they lose!”), with 151 CONG. REC. S2459, 2459 
(daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (noting how the bill helps women), 151 CONG. 
REC. S2462, S2463 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Biden) (indicating that the bill “puts 
women and children first” and suggesting that opponents who contend the bill harms women and 
children “are fabricating wild claims”), and 147 CONG. REC. 3456, 3462 (2001) (statement of Sen. 
Sessions) (explaining how the bill “place[d] women and children at the highest possible level of 
protection”).  
 97. 150 CONG. REC. H148, 154 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2004) (statement of Rep. Watt) (“Let me just 
correct a couple of things that have been put out here that seem to me to need correction. First of all, 
child support and alimony are already nondischargeable and all of the women’s and children’s 
advocacy groups oppose this bill. So do not be misled by this claim that somehow or another this bill 
is going to do something to help women’s and children’s advocacy groups with child support.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1861 Dickerson book pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1882 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1861 
 
 
 
 
making it harder for debtors to get a quick Chapter 7 discharge would 
harm women. The harm, opponents maintained, was that women would be 
forced to compete with large financial creditors to collect payments from 
debtors who (1) failed the means test and (2) remained saddled with debts 
that would have been discharged under the pre-BAPCPA Code.98 Because 
women would lose in a head-to-head competition with credit card 
companies, making it harder for men to discharge other debts would result 
in them having fewer funds post discharge to make child or spousal 
support payments.99 Likewise, opponents argued that forcing more debtors 
into Chapter 13 repayment plans, making them devote more of their 
income to debt repayment, and forcing more debtors into five (rather than 
three) year plans would harm women who had nondischargeable, priority 
support claims because debtors would have fewer funds available to make 
support payments post-discharge.100 
The legislation’s opponents succeeded in forcing its supporters to 
accept amendments that protected women even though these changes 
clearly did not benefit the consumer credit industry. For example, the 
bankruptcy legislation was amended in 2001 to exclude child support 
payments debtors received when calculating the funds debtors were 
required to devote to Chapter 13 plan payments.101 Decreasing a debtor’s 
disposable income necessarily would harm unsecured creditors who had 
dischargeable claims (like credit card issuers) because debtors would 
repay a smaller percentage of their debts in a Chapter 13 plan. Likewise, 
both sponsors and supporters of the legislation offered amendments that 
gave spousal and child support debts the highest priority payment in 
Chapter 7 and otherwise enhanced custodial parents’ ability to receive 
child support from debtors.102 An unrelated, though still largely gendered, 
 
 
 98.  See Tabb, supra note 78, at 38 (noting that the proposed bill expanded the group of creditors 
who may pursue payments post-bankruptcy, thus forcing mothers collecting support to compete with 
the credit industry over the resources of bankrupt “deadbeat dads”). 
 99. 151 CONG. REC. H1974, 1982-83 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (letter from National Women’s 
Law Center) (arguing that the proposed bill increases competition between mothers owed child support 
and credit issuers for the scarce resources of bankrupt men); id. at 1983 (letter from Leadership 
Conference on Civil Rights) (asserting that the proposed bill would divert support payments away 
from mothers to credit card issuers); 147 CONG. REC. 2749, 2756 (2001) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
 100. 151 CONG. REC. S2216, 2225 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Dodd).  
 101. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, 107th Cong. § 218(b) (2001). BAPCPA codified 
this exclusion at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A). See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102(h), 119 Stat. 23, 33–34 (2005).  
 102. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H11852, 11915 (statement of Rep. Boucher). In addition to 
making domestic support obligations the highest priority debt, creditors (either ex-spouses or the 
government) can continue to garnish a debtor’s wages for support payments. Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, § 214 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(c)). 
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provision in BAPCPA allows debtors who incurred expenses to protect 
themselves against an abusive partner to include those expenses when 
performing the means test, even if those additional expenses caused them 
to have living expenses that exceeded the amounts specified in the means 
test.103  
B. Other Interest Groups 
Congress considered the interests of other politically influential groups 
while the bankruptcy legislation was pending. For example, both 
supporters and opponents of the legislation stressed that their position best 
protected seniors.104 To decrease the harm the proposed legislation would 
have on seniors, amendments were offered to exclude social security 
payments from the means test’s definition of income.105 Similarly, the 
legislation was revised to allow debtors to deduct their reasonable 
expenses for their continued care and support of elderly or disabled 
members of their household.106 The legislation also revised existing law 
and increased protections for retirement income by letting debtors exempt 
all types of tax-favored qualified pension plan assets from their estates, 
protect IRAs valued at one million dollars, and keep retirement funds that 
were in the process of being rolled over into a new qualified plan.107 In 
 
 
Further, debtors cannot confirm a Chapter 13 plan unless they have paid all domestic support debts 
that are in arrears, BAPCPA § 213(10) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(8)), nor can they receive a 
Chapter 13 discharge unless all support payments have been paid in full, BAPCPA § 213(11) (codified 
at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)).  
 103. BAPCPA § 102(a) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)). 
 104. Compare, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. 11364, 11365–66 (2000) (statement of Sen. Biden) (“My 
mother living on Social Security pays more at the department store to purchase something . . . because 
someone else does not pay.”), with 151 CONG. REC. S1892, S1906 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2005) (statement 
of Sen. Kennedy) (“We have three times the number of bankruptcies now for our senior citizens. 
These are not the spendthrifts. Are those the people we are trying to catch with punitive measures in 
this bankruptcy legislation? I don’t think so.”), 145 CONG. REC. 22970, 22971 (1999) (statement of 
Sen. Kyl) (noting support for legislation because it was not “fair” to force “seniors on fixed incomes to 
pay more so that someone can walk away from his or her debts as a matter of convenience or financial 
planning.”), and 150 CONG. REC. H143, H146 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2004) (statement of Rep. Lofgren) 
(arguing that the legislation hurts seniors). 
 105. 145 CONG. REC. 8498, 8504 (1999) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (discussing proposed 
amendment to exclude social security benefits from means test definition of income). Though the 
amendment was defeated that year, a later amendment was codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(B). See 
Bankruptcy Abuse Protection and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 § 102(b). 
 106. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 833, 107th Cong. Sec. 707 (2000). This provision is 
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II). See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 § 102(a). 
 107. 144 CONG. REC. 20721, 20728 (1998) (Hatch Amendment No. 3600). BAPCPA clarifies that 
debtors can continue to contribute to employer-provided retirement plans, that any payroll deduction to 
repay a pension loan is not stayed by the filing, and that Chapter 13 debtors may continue to repay 
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arguing in favor of protecting retirement savings, one of the amendment’s 
sponsors stressed that the amendment was needed to protect “[t]he 
retirement savings of hundreds of thousands of elderly Americans” and 
further noted that the amendment “has the full support of the AARP.”108 
The legislation’s supporters and opponents also argued that their side’s 
views best protected the interests of members of the armed forces.109 To 
avoid potentially alienating veterans or active duty or retired military 
personnel, amendments were offered to protect veterans and active duty 
service people by excluding veterans benefits from the means test’s 
definition of income,110 by exempting certain active duty service members 
from BAPCPA’s credit counseling requirements,111 and by otherwise 
easing the generally inflexible requirements contained in the means test for 
debtors who had served in the military.112 Similarly, to appeal to the 
public’s (then) support of the War on Terrorism, BAPCPA was amended 
in 2002 to exclude payments received by victims of international or 
domestic terrorism from the Code’s definition of income that must be 
considered when determining whether a debtor “flunks” the means test and 
cannot remain in Chapter 7.113 
 
 
loans they took out against their pension funds. Bankruptcy Abuse Protevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 § 224(b), (d)–(e) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(19), 1322(f), 522(n)). 
 108. 144 CONG. REC. 20701, 20701 (1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 109. 151 CONG. REC. S1842 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Sessions) (“I just want to 
say how strongly I value the contribution of our men and women in uniform.”). Indeed, in discussing a 
failed amendment that would have provided protections for members of the armed services, one 
senator stated that the senators who opposed the amendment  
are the first ones waving the flag in the Fourth of July parade: How much we love our 
soldiers.  
Where were they yesterday? These great lovers of the American military were nowhere to be 
found when they had a chance to do something for them when they serve their country and 
face bankruptcy at home. 
151 CONG. REC. S1982, 1907 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin). 
 110. H.R. REP. NO. 106-123, at 106–107 (1999). See also 151 CONG. REC. S2424, S2427 (daily 
ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (“Mr. President, this amendment will exempt from the 
bankruptcy bill’s means test those disabled veterans whose indebtedness occurred primarily during a 
period of military service. They have given us their arms, their legs, their very important parts of their 
lives. . . . We need to honor these veterans who have given so much to America.”). 
 111. 151 CONG. REC. S2306, 2314–16 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 
 112. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act § 102(a) (codified at 11 U.S.C. 
§ 707(b)(2)(B)). The Code permits active duty military personnel who have income above the 
applicable state median to cite their military duties as special circumstances that warrant avoiding the 
statutory presumption of abuse. The Code also creates an exception from having to satisfy many 
aspects of the means test for disabled veterans who prove that they incurred their debts while on active 
duty or performing homeland defense activity. Id. (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(d)). 
 113. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 5745, § 102, 
107th Cong. § 102(b) (2002), codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 (10A). See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 § 102(b). 
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V. IDEOLOGY 
A. Ideology Generally 
In addition to ignoring conflicting special interest group concerns, 
explaining the BAPCPA legislative process using a single industry capture 
story is incomplete because it fails to account for the possibility that the 
members of Congress who supported it did so because of their ideological 
objections to the values inherent in the pre-BAPCPA Code. A big 
impediment to determining whether BAPCPA’s legislative process (or, 
indeed, any legislative process) was ideological—and, if so, the precise 
ideological disputes that are at issue—is that there is no single agreed 
upon definition for the term ideology.114 Commentators who have 
examined judicial decisionmaking appear to have reached a rough 
consensus on the definition of ideology. In that context, ideology typically 
is defined as the views a judge or judicial candidate holds that influence 
how he or she makes (or likely will make) decisions or the extent to which 
those views affect the judicial decisionmaking process.115 The most widely 
accepted method to measure a judge’s ideology is to determine the 
political party affiliation of the President that appointed the judge, and 
then examine how the judge’s votes on certain issues coincide with the 
votes of judges appointed by the opposite party.116 Although 
commentators recognize the limitations of this method of measuring 
ideology, and although this measure has been criticized and refined in 
 
 
 114. See John M. Conley, The Social Science of Ideology and the Ideology of Social Science, 72 
N.C. L. REV. 1249, 1249–50 (1994) (defining ideology as “a system of shared beliefs by which a group 
of people interpret and impart meaning to events”); Michael J. Gerhardt, Merit vs. Ideology, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 353, 369 (2005) (defining ideology in the constitutional context as a “pre-
commitment” to particular constitutional values); Dawn E. Johnsen, Should Ideology Matter in 
Selecting Federal Judges?: Ground Rules for the Debate, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 463, 468 (2005) 
(defining ideology as either the mode of thinking that characterizes a collection of people or as the set 
of doctrines that forms the basis for various societal systems).  
 115. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE, at xii (1998); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Idealogy and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 621 (2003). 
See generally John Cornyn, Originalism & Judicial Confirmation Hearings, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 
2 (2005) (discussing a definition of ideology as one that affects how judicial nominees “expect to rule 
on a list of hot-button political issues”). 
 116. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 115, at xii n.b. See, e.g., ASHLYN K. KUERSTEN & DONALD 
R. SONGER, DECISIONS ON THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2001); DONALD SONGER ET AL., 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS (2000); Gregory C. Sisk & 
Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates about Statistical Measures, 99 
NW. U. L. REV. 743, 747–48 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, 
Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 
(2004). 
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recent sociological works,117 it remains the most widely used measure for 
whether a judge’s conduct is based on ideology.118 
Outside the judicial decisionmaking context, ideology generally is 
defined as a set of doctrines, beliefs, or ideas that form the basis of a 
political system or economic theory and policy.119 Likewise, ideology 
typically is thought to mean a common and coherent philosophy, outlook, 
or shared body of ideas or beliefs120 or a worldview or cultural belief 
system that helps individuals (or groups) generate and inform their 
decisionmaking process.121 In this context, commentators suggest that 
people or groups use ideology to help them “make sense of events, build 
consensus, and distinguish themselves from others.”122 At times, though, 
ideology is used pejoratively to imply that a person (the “ideologue”) 
holds views that make the person “an inflexible and uncritical true 
believer.”123 An even more negative connotation of ideology suggests that 
it is simply a defensive tool used by the powerful elite to legitimize the 
status quo and maintain economic inequality.124  
Political and academic commentators often define ideology relative to 
the term “political.”125 Of course, ideological must mean more than just 
 
 
 117. Sisk & Heise, supra note 116, at 779–87 (discussing “common space” score measure of 
ideology that is designed to rate “each legislative vote cast by members of the Senate along a 
conservative-liberal dichotomy”); Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter Wiedenbeck, The Ideological 
Component of Judging in the Taxation Context, 84 WASH U. L. REV. 1797 (2006) (discussing Segal-
Cover methodology for measuring judicial ideology, but noting limitations of that measure to predict 
votes in business cases). 
 118. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron & Harold J. Spaeth, Ideological 
Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. OF POL. 812, 812 (1995) 
(explaining that the attitudinal model, which posits that a judge’s political ideology is the best 
predictor of how that judge will vote, is “[a] predominant, if not the predominant” model for analyzing 
Supreme Court decisionmaking). 
 119. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 871 (4th ed. 2000); 
RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 950 (2d ed. 1993). 
 120. JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW LANGUAGE, AND POWER 141 
(2d ed. 2005); Conley, supra note 114, at 1249.  
 121. See David S. Caudill, Freud and Critical Legal Studies: Contours of a Radical Socio-Legal 
Psychoanalysis, 66 IND. L.J. 651, 653, 662 (1991) (noting that ideology is used to inform thought); 
Conley, supra note 114, at 1249 (noting that ideology helps people “make sense of events, build 
consensus, and distinguish themselves from others”).  
 122. See Conley, supra note 114, at 1249. 
 123. CONLEY & O’BARR, supra note 120, at 141. 
 124. Edward L. Rubin, Rational Choice and Rat Choice: Some Thoughts on the Relationship 
Among Rationality, Markets, and Human Beings, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1091, 1117 (2005). 
 125. SKEEL, supra note 29, at 199–201 (discussing the “sharply ideological political landscape” 
that existed when the Bankruptcy Commission initially considered means testing); Johnsen, supra note 
114, at 469 (noting Sen. Schumer’s use of the term political ideology). See also Stephen B. Presser, 
The Original Misunderstanding: The English, The Americans, and The Dialectic of Federalist 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NW. L. REV. 106, 110 n.16 (1990). 
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political or else all U.S. laws would be ideological since they are enacted 
in a political process. Other commentators deem an issue to be ideological 
if it is partisan126 or likely to draw support from either conservatives or 
liberals, but not both.127 Similarly, laws or issues are often categorized as 
ideological if they involve constitutional interpretations or issues that 
easily can be placed on a conservative-liberal, left-right axis.128 Although 
in many respects this approach might be the most satisfying, this approach 
is itself problematic due to the difficulties in delineating “conservative” or 
“liberal” views.129 
Ideology also has different meanings in the context of public choice 
analyses. In analyzing the role ideology plays in the political process, the 
term has been defined as a legislator’s “individual beliefs about the public 
interest.”130 Some suggest that legislators’ ideological views play little role 
in the legislative process because they are motivated primarily by a desire 
to please their constituents. Given this desire, they would be willing to 
 
 
 126. See SKEEL, supra note 29, at 199 (discussing “ideological tone” of the Bankruptcy 
Commission’s work and arguing that there were no ideological division in votes on the 1978 Code 
because both Democrats and Republicans voted for those reforms by large majorities); id. at 201 
(suggesting that the Commission’s work was ideological because the reporter for the commission—
Harvard Law Professor Elizabeth Warren—was “famously partisan”). 
 127. Joanne Conaghan, Wishful Thinking or Bad Faith: A Feminist Encounter with Duncan 
Kennedy’s Critique of Adjudication, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 721, 726 (2001) (referring to conflicts 
generated by conservative or liberal ideologies); Conley, supra note 114, at 1249 (referring to 
“feminism, conservatism, and environmentalism” as ideological belief systems); Einer Elhauge, Are 
Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 114 (1997) (modeling “Sally Conservative’s” 
views on ideological issues). 
 128. See Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 116, at 304 (discussing “controversial issues” 
like abortion, affirmative action, campaign finance, capital punishment, disability, race, and sex 
discrimination). While recognizing that any list of ideological issues can be attacked as being either 
over- or under-inclusive, the following topics typically are viewed as ideological: affirmative action, 
civil rights (including discrimination and harassment), death penalty, due process, federalism, 
feminism, privacy (including abortion), gun control, immigration, unions, social security, tort reform, 
and first amendment matters (including free speech, pornography, and separation of church and state). 
See Chemerinsky, supra note 115, at 621; DONALD R. SONGER, THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF 
APPEALS DATA BASE DOCUMENTATION FOR PHASE I, at 6 (1997), http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ 
ulmerproject/cta_codebook.pdf (coding the various issues presented in cases decided by appellate 
courts along a conservative-liberal axis). 
 129. William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1217 (2002) (noting ambiguity of the term conservative); Christopher H. Schroeder, Foreword, 
Conservative and Progressive Legal Orders, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5 (2004) (questioning 
whether it is possible to create a consensus definition of “conservative” or “progressive” judicial 
approaches); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Why Conservative Jurisprudence is Compassionate, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 753, 754 (2003) (describing the difficulty of capturing the “essence” of conservative and liberal 
ideologies).  
 130. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 67, at 893. 
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support bills that serve their constituents’ interests even if the bill is 
inconsistent with their personal ideological beliefs or views.131  
It is, of course, possible that any given legislator’s stated ideological 
views concerning the bankruptcy legislation were colored by the economic 
interests of the consumer credit lobby. It is also possible, however, that 
some legislators were true believers, i.e., they supported BAPCPA not just 
because of the economic stakes involved but because its normative 
principles are consistent with their world views and philosophy concerning 
the importance of paying your bills.132  
B. Ideology and the Bankruptcy Reform Legislative Debates  
Even if the credit card lobby wrote BAPCPA and then made substantial 
contributions to members of certain important congressional committees 
to ensure its passage,133 the fact that so many members of Congress 
consistently and overwhelmingly supported bankruptcy reform for almost 
a decade is consistent with the “story” that some of them might actually 
have agreed with the legislation’s implicit ideological views. The 
legislative process for the bankruptcy reform bills was always bitterly 
partisan,134 and many viewed it as advancing “conservative” anti-
consumer beliefs.135 However, as noted earlier, the legislation consistently 
had bipartisan support, and earlier attempts to enact the legislation failed 
for reasons having little to do with the ideological outlook or worldviews 
that permeate the legislation (e.g., that people should sacrifice to pay their 
bills).136 Reasons earlier versions of BAPCPA (and, indeed other bills) 
 
 
 131. Id.  
 132. See Kathleen Bawn, Constructing “Us”: Ideology, Coalition Politics, and False 
Consciousness, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 303, 304 (1999) (defining ideology as those beliefs and preferences 
that do not stem from self-interest). 
 133. See Stephen Nunez & Howard Rosenthal, Bankruptcy “Reform” in Congress: Creditors, 
Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 527 (2004) 
(arguing that campaign contributions to select members of Congress made a statistically significant 
impact). 
 134. Of course, this also should not have been surprising since the House committee that dealt 
with the legislation was the Judiciary Committee—the same Committee that was tasked to handle the 
Clinton impeachment process and that handles the judicial nomination process. 
 135. For example, Henry J. Hyde—an admitted conservative and then chair of the House Judiciary 
Committee—proposed amendments to the means test that would allow courts to use more flexible 
standards to calculate a debtor’s living expenses. 145 CONG. REC. H2718–19 (1999). After fellow 
Republicans rejected that amendment, he commented that he was “as conservative as anybody” and 
that his desire to create more flexible living expense standards should not be viewed as “a violation of 
one’s credentials as a conservative.” 145 CONG. REC. 8509, 8579 (1999). 
 136. For example, all Republican members of the House, and more than forty percent of the 
Democrats, voted in favor of means testing legislation that did not contain a homestead cap. See 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/7
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were pushed to the rear of the legislative agenda during the nine-year 
period include the Congressional preoccupation with the Clinton 
impeachment proceeding, a midyear change of control in the Senate, the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, and the anthrax scare.137  
Because issues that tend to be viewed as ideological (abortion, gun 
control, the U.S. flag, religion, cloning, etc.) are also highly 
controversial,138 characterizing an issue as “ideological” tends to 
dramatically change the tenor of discussions about the issue and may in 
fact serve as an “all-purpose trump card that can end any game.”139 
Although the word “ideology” appears numerous times in the legislative 
debates on bills that all would agree are ideological,140 the term “ideology” 
in any form appears only six times in the Congressional Record during 
testimony concerning the bankruptcy bills that were considered from 
1997–2005.141 Thus, although the debates may have been tinged with 
ideological concerns about the ways people should approach their personal 
 
 
Jensen, supra note 28, at 512–13. Likewise, ninety-seven members of the Senate voted in favor of 
legislation that would change existing laws by, for example, imposing a homestead cap; it did not, 
however, include means testing. Id. at 512–15. Because the House and Senate passed different 
versions of the bill, a conference was convened to attempt to reconcile the two bills. Id. at 516. The 
Senate never considered the conference report. Id. at 518. The House passed it by a veto-proof vote of 
300 to 125. 144 CONG. REC. 24926, 24943 (1998). 
 137. See Jensen, supra note 28, at 514, 545–46, 548–49. 
 138. Former Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert issued a statement on June 27, 2006, that listed 
the House Republican “American Values Agenda.” See Press Release, J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of 
the House, Speaker Hastert Statement on the House Republican American Values Agenda (Jun. 27, 
2006), http://speakersnews.house.gov/library/misc/060627americanvalues.shtml (last visited Jan. 5, 
2007). Included on the agenda are the bills that are designed to do the following: protect the pledge of 
allegiance “from the attacks by activist federal judges”; protect the right to display the flag; enact a 
constitutional amendment “declaring marriage to be between a man and a woman”; require medical 
professionals to tell women that an unborn child feels pain if she has a late-term abortion; ban the use 
of stem cells; restrict internet gambling; and prevent the government from using federal funds to seize 
guns from “law-abiding citizens.” Id. Cf. Thomas E. Nelson, Zoe M. Oxley & Rosalee A. Clawson, 
Toward a Psychology of Framing Effects, 19 POL. BEHAV. 221 (1997) (examining how 
communicators—typically the mass media—use framing, the construction and definition of a 
particular issue, to influence public opinion).  
 139. John D. Ayer, So Near to Cleveland, So Far From God: An Essay on the Ethnography of 
Bankruptcy, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 439 (1992). 
 140. For example, the word “ideology” or “ideological” appears more than ten times (either as 
used by senators or in essay submitted in the record) during a May 24, 2005 debate on “The Stem Cell 
Research Enhancement Act of 2005.” 151 CONG. REC. H3809–H3852 (daily ed. May 24, 2005); H.R. 
810, 109th Cong. (2005). Likewise, those terms appear eight times during the May 16, 2002 debate on 
the “Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2002.” 148 CONG. REC. 7917–7993 
(2002). Finally, on one of the days (over the course of the two-year debate) that the Senate considered 
the Nomination of Miguel Estrada to the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, those terms were used thirteen 
times. 149 CONG. REC. S2307–S2334 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2003).  
 141. Westlaw search conducted by author on April 13, 2007, on the “Bankruptcy Reform Act 
Congressional Record” database (BKRA-CR), using the search term “ideolog!”.  
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financial decisions, individual members did not appear to think that they—
or those who held opposing views—were making ideological decisions, as 
“ideology” is traditionally conceptualized on a left-right, liberal-
conservative, Democrat-Republican axis. Of course, it is not surprising 
that the legislators did not perceive that they were debating an ideological 
issue given the Washington Post’s characterization of bankruptcy 
opinions.142 
Since legislators so rarely used the term ideology (and its variants) 
during the nine-year legislative debates on the bankruptcy legislation and 
because liberal and conservative members of both parties supported the 
legislation, it is hard to view the legislation as ideological in a liberal-
conservative sense of that term. Legislators may have concluded that the 
legislative debates and disagreements were not ideological because of the 
perception that bankruptcy laws are neutral and non-ideological143 and 
lack the emotional baggage of many hot button public-law issues like 
abortion, flag burning, gay marriage, or gun control. Even those who view 
bankruptcy laws as ideological, or who attempt to determine whether 
bankruptcy laws might be ideological, tend to define the dispute as either 
pro-debtor or pro-creditor.144 Commentators often conclude that a pro-
debtor ideological view is liberal (or progressive), while a pro-creditor 
bias is conservative.145  
Although many legislators referenced the Enron and WorldCom 
scandals during the legislative debates,146 defining “ideology” in the 
 
 
 142. See About the Analysis, supra note 7, and accompanying text.  
 143. Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence Through a Bankruptcy Lens: A Study in the Supreme 
Court’s Bankruptcy Cases, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 4 & n.7 (1996) (suggesting that bankruptcy is 
non-ideological, but noting that lawyers might not agree with such a conclusion); Nourse & Schacter, 
supra note 86, at 587 (characterizing gun control, abortion, and pornography as “hot button issues” as 
compared to intellectual property and bankruptcy); Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 116, at 
310 (characterizing bankruptcy cases as nonideological). But cf. SKEEL, supra note 29, at 191 
(discussing the ideologically driven debates over the bankruptcy legislative debate and the “credit 
morality”). 
 144. See John T. Scott, James F. Spriggs II & James R. Zink, Courtin’ the Public: Judicial 
Behavior and Public Views of Court Decisions 16, 34 (2006) (unpublished manuscript prepared for 
2006 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, available at http://www.utexas. 
edu/law/academics/centers/clbe/assets/spriggs/pdf) (describing empirical study that controlled for 
ideology in bankruptcy cases using pro-debtor and pro-creditor as relevant factors to determine 
whether respondent has liberal or conservative views). 
 145. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Bankruptcy Reform Act in the Supreme Court, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 
477, 566 (1988) (examining Supreme Court bankruptcy cases from 1978 to 1986 and concluding that 
the generally conservative Court tends to favor creditors over debtors); SKEEL, supra note 29, at 16, 
194. 
 146. 151 CONG. REC. S2406 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“After these 
individuals, the Ebbers, the Skillings, Enron, and the rest, robbed those companies, they are sitting in 
their mansions now in Houston; but these other individuals will be dragged into bankruptcy court if 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/7
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bankruptcy context in ways that are used in public-law disputes (liberal v. 
conservative, rich v. poor) mischaracterizes the nature of disputes that 
arise in consumer and business bankruptcy cases. Debtors can be large 
corporations that have not engaged in fraudulent conduct (like Texaco, US 
Airways, or Kmart). Conversely, creditors are not always businesses as 
they can be individuals (like ex-spouses or former employees) in both 
consumer and business cases. Given the wide range of people and entities 
who serve as debtors and creditors in bankruptcy cases, it is just too 
simplistic to conclude that a pro-debtor view is necessarily a “liberal” 
view since the debtor may be a large multinational corporation that, in 
more lucrative days, may have made campaign contributions to members 
of Congress.147 
Although legislators rarely used the term “ideology,” the debates were 
framed using language that fairly could be viewed as ideological in the 
sense that the legislation advances a particular philosophy, worldview, or 
belief system that would force debtors to make better financial decisions. 
For example, supporters argued that the process should be a stigmatizing 
one.148 Likewise, as was true during legislative debates on human 
cloning,149 stem cell,150 and abortion,151 the BAPCPA legislative history is 
replete with statements—made by Democrats and Republicans, liberals 
and conservatives—involving morality (“moral principle[s];” the “time-
honored principle of moral responsibility”) and consumers’ lack of shame 
when filing for bankruptcy.152 Supporters focused on the culture of 
 
 
they get a serious illness or sickness, or if they run into family problems.”); 151 CONG. REC. S1822 
(daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (discussing the moral responsibilities of former 
Enron and WorldCom executives); 148 CONG. REC. 5087 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2002) (statement of Sen. 
Kohl) (discussing bankruptcy planning of former Enron executives who retained multi-million dollar 
homes by taking advantage of homestead exemptions). 
147. For example, in 1996, Enron contributed over $1.2 million to candidates or political 
parties in federal elections, over $1.1 million in 1998, and over $2.5 million in 2000. See 
Opensecrets.org. Donor Profiles: Enron Corp., http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.asp?ID= 
D000000137&Name=Enron+Corp (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). 
 148. 151 CONG. REC. S1813 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Frist) (“Bankruptcy has 
become so common that it has lost the stigma it had even a short generation ago.”); 146 CONG. REC. 
11364, 11366 (2000) (statement of Sen. Biden) (“Although this may seem like a quaint notion these 
days, it was intended to preserve some of the debtor’s dignity at a time when bankruptcy carried more 
of a stigma for some people than it does today.”). 
 149. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. H4767 (daily ed. July 27, 2001) (statement of Rep. Weldon); 147 
CONG. REC. H7858 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2001) (statement of Rep. Pence).  
 150. See Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, H.R. 1644, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (2001); 
Respect for Life Pluripotent Stem Cell Act of 2005, H.R. 3144, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (2005). 
 151. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. S11552 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum); 
149 CONG. REC. S3457 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Frist). 
 152. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 3150 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial 
and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 11 (1998) (statement of Rep. Moran) 
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bankruptcy and the importance of “personal responsibility,” and they 
suggested that debtors lacked integrity because they no longer felt any 
personal obligation to pay debts they could afford to repay.153 Moreover, 
supporters argued that the bankruptcy system—aided and abetted by 
bankruptcy attorneys, judges, and professors—encouraged debtor abuse, 
and that the system did not stress that bankruptcy should be a difficult 
process.154  
 
 
[hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 3150]. Moran supported the bill though his overall voting record 
indicates that he is a liberal Democrat, thus indicating that BAPCPA cannot be cast simply in left-right 
terms ideologically. Biography of Rep. Moran, GovTrack, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/person. 
xpd?id=400283 (last visited Apr. 11, 2007). For example, he has sponsored legislation that would 
extend stem cell research. Conservative and Republic members of Congress have routinely (though not 
uniformly) opposed the expansion of stem cell research. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, House 
Approves a Stem Cell Research Bill Opposed by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2005, at A1. In arguing in 
favor of that legislation, Rep. Moran implicitly noted the left-right ideological divide on this matter in 
urging other members of Congress to “[l]et public interest triumph over ideological special interests.” 
152 CONG. REC. H5435, H5448 (daily ed. Jul. 19, 2006). Likewise, he urged House Republicans to 
increase the minimum wage, noting that “over the last 9 years gas prices have doubled; college prices 
are up 38 percent; food prices, up 20 percent; housing, up 25 percent; and health care costs, up a 
whopping 75 percent. But the minimum wage hasn’t budged over that period of time.” 152 CONG. 
REC. H4965 (daily ed. Jul. 11, 2006). Given his support for BAPCPA, Rep. Moran appeared unwilling 
to believe that low wages combined with higher food, housing, and health care costs contributed to the 
increased bankruptcy filing rates during the first part of that same nine year period. Instead, his 
consistent support of the bankruptcy legislation and of amendments to increase the minimum wage 
suggests that he believed that other factors—perhaps a lack of personal responsibility—also caused the 
increase in individual bankruptcy filings.  
 153. See 151 CONG. REC. S1856 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“I think the 
system needs to be reformed because it is fundamentally unfair. This bill will promote personal 
responsibility among borrowers and create a deterrence for those hoping to cheat the system.”). See 
also Hearing on H.R. 3150, supra note 152, at 11 (statement of Rep. Moran) (suggesting that “moral 
principal has been eviscerated” because bankruptcy is now the “option of first resort” for some debtors 
who are capable of repaying their debts). Indeed, Rep. Moran and other members of the New 
Democrat Coalition routinely stated that bankruptcy laws needed to be reformed and that the pending 
legislation “promotes personal responsibility.” See Press Release, New Democrat Coalition, supra note 
33 (quoting Rep. Roemer).  
 154. See Hearing on H.R. 3150, supra note 164, at 11 (statement of Rep. Moran) (characterizing 
pre-BAPCPA bankruptcy as “a convenient financial management tool” and highlighting its 
“convenience” and “ease”); id. at 12–14 (prepared statement of Rep. Moran); 151 CONG. REC. S1834, 
S1843 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (stating that debtors’ abusive “misconduct is 
all too often encouraged by a bankruptcy bar that ushers people into Chapter 7 without ever fully 
considering the client’s ability to repay”); 147 CONG. REC. 3737, 3737 (Mar. 15, 2001) (statement of 
Sen. Sessions) (“[T]his is fundamentally what the lawyer tells them. He says: Now, when you get your 
paycheck, you save that money, and you bring it straight to me—all that money—and maybe your 
second check. As soon as I have $1,500 or $1,000, I will file your bankruptcy. Don’t pay any of your 
other debts. . . . Use your credit card. Run up everything you want to on your credit card. . . . They are 
told this is the right thing to do.”). Indeed, one critic went so far as to say that bankruptcy judges (who 
he branded as not “real judges”) were part of the problem because they failed to exercise discretion in 
the ways that favored creditors. See Peter G. Gosselin, Judges Say Overhaul Would Weaken 
Bankruptcy System, L.A. TIMES (Mar 29, 2005), at 1 (quoting Jeff Tassey, a “Washington lobbyist 
who heads the coalition of credit card companies, banks and others who spearheaded the overhaul 
drive”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/7
p 1861 Dickerson book pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] REGULATING BANKRUPTCY 1893 
 
 
 
 
BAPCPA critics also relied on the concept of morality to bolster their 
opposition to the legislation. Opponents disputed claims that there has 
been a decline in the stigma associated with filing for bankruptcy and 
instead argued that credit card issuers lacked shame when mailing billions 
of pre-approved credit card applications to people who appeared to be bad 
credit risks.155 Thus, they maintained that creditors behaved immorally by 
recklessly extending credit to debtors who were already hopelessly in 
debt.156 Indeed, opponents (including some financial institutions)157 
suggested that the credit card industry could have prevented most of the 
perceived abuses if they had engaged in better screening processes and had 
stopped issuing credit cards to debtors who were not creditworthy (or were 
children, pets, moose, inmates, or corpses).158 
Though legislators avoided using the term “ideology,” statements in the 
legislative history suggest that BAPCPA’s primary goal of making it 
harder to avoid paying your debts was consistent with a philosophy or 
worldview that every able-bodied person in this country can succeed 
financially if they handle their personal finances responsibly and avoid 
incurring too much debt.159 These legislators appear to conclude that, if 
 
 
 155.  See Hearing on H.R. 3150, supra note 152, at 4 (statement of Rep. Nadler) (“I do not think 
. . . that a creditor, who makes a subprime loan to a debtor who is already clearly in over his head, 
should necessarily be allowed to have the taxpayers bail out his reckless business activities.”).  
 156. See Examining the Increase of Personal Bankruptcies and the Crisis in Consumer Credit: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
105th Cong. 63 (1997) (statement of Sen. Durbin); 151 CONG. REC. H1979, H1979–80 (daily ed. Apr. 
14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Delahunt) (arguing that BAPCPA “imposes no responsibility whatsoever 
on the credit card industry . . .”).  
 157. See 151 CONG. REC. S1840 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (February 28, 2005 Letter from 
Responsible Lenders in Opposition to S. 256, The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act). 
 158. 147 CONG. REC. 2749, 2752 (2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“Billions of credit card 
solicitations made to American consumers in the past few years have contributed to the rise in 
consumer debt and bankruptcies, including a 7 or 8 year old receiving a credit card with a long line of 
credit, or a dog gets a credit card. Somebody puts their dog’s name on an answer to a letter, and 
suddenly the dog is getting a credit card with an approval letter: Dear Mr. Rover Leahy: We are so 
impressed with your past credit card we are now giving you a $2,000 credit line.”); 144 CONG. REC. 
21594, 21599–21601 (1998) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); Credit Cards at 50: The Problems of 
Ubiquity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2000, at C11 (reporting that former Federal Reserve Chair Alan 
Greenspan told the Senate Banking Committee that “[c]hildren, dogs, cats and moose are getting credit 
cards”).  
Ultimately, opponents proposed a series of amendments (most of which failed) that were designed 
to curb what opponents viewed as immoral or abusive creditor conduct. See 144 CONG. REC. 20650 
(1998) (Senate amendment proposing to prohibit creditors from terminating credit simply because the 
consumer did not incur finance charges); 144 CONG REC. 20650, 20651 (1998) (Senate amendment 
proposing to limit fees banks charge for using ATMs); 144 CONG REC. 20650, 20657–58 (1998) 
(Senate amendment proposing to place restrictions on credit offered to consumers under age twenty-
one). 
 159. Cf. 145 CONG. REC. 8509, 8517 (1999) (statement of Rep. Kelly) (“If one assumes a debt, 
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you chose to borrow too much, then the solution is to devote a significant 
amount of your human capital to digging yourself out of debt—filing for 
bankruptcy should not be the solution.160 All people, BAPCPA supporters 
argued, must understand that they have an obligation to accept “personal 
responsibility” for their spending decisions.161  
The phrase “personal responsibility” was used almost seventy times 
during debates concerning the proposed bills.162 Unfortunately, supporters 
never explained whether personal responsibility meant a duty to avoid 
excessive extravagant spending, a duty to repay debts (whether frivolous 
or not) that you can afford to pay, or a heightened duty to do whatever it 
takes to repay all your debts if you made a conscious decision to become 
overindebted for reasons other than military service or unexpected medical 
expenses. Although legislators rarely explained what they meant by 
“personal responsibility,” the congressional debates and the eventual text 
of BAPCPA suggests that Congress deemed only a small subset of people 
truly “deserving” of bankruptcy relief and that this subset includes only 
those who were rendered unable to pay their debts through no fault of their 
own.163 This might explain why legislators generally were sympathetic to 
people who got sick and incurred medical debts they were unable to pay, 
but were generally unsympathetic to people who experienced financial 
distress because they overextended themselves after losing a job or getting 
a divorce.164 Moreover, consistent with the philosophy or worldview that 
 
 
they should do everything in their power to pay if off.”); 145 CONG. REC. H2655 (statement of Rep. 
Tauscher) (“Those who buy on credit should be required to pay their bills. Our current bankruptcy 
system does not hold people to that standard.”). But cf. id. at H2663 (statement of Rep. Nadler) (“So 
this is a myth . . . that the American middle class are deadbeats and that we have to crack down and 
squeeze a little bit more money out of them when they go bankrupt . . . .”). 
 160. The view that people should keep their commitments, or face sanctions if they fail to, is of 
course not a new one. Indeed, earlier efforts to reform bankruptcy laws were marked by tensions 
between norms that required people to keep their commitments and concerns that imposing overly 
harsh bankruptcy laws might threaten the stability of the middle-class. See generally BRUCE H. MANN, 
REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 180, 255–256 
(2002). 
 161.  151 CONG. REC. H2047 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner); 151 
Cong. Rec. S2474 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Frist). 
 162. Westlaw search conducted by author on April 13, 2007, on the “Bankruptcy Reform Act 
Congressional Record” database (BKRA-CR), using the search terms “personal responsibility” and 
finding 68 documents that contained term (sometimes multiple occurrences within a document). 
 163. Again, this narrow conceptualization of the deserving debtor is not new. See WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 473 (1771), available at 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com (follow hyperlink for “Early American Imprints, Series 1: Evans, 1639–
1800”; search “Commentaries on the Laws of England”) (stating that traders were the only “set of men 
[that] are, generally speaking, the only persons liable to accidental losses, and to an inability of paying 
their debts, without any fault of their own”).  
 164. See supra note 40. 
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bankruptcy should be readily available only for people who are facing 
financial crises though no fault of their own, even politically liberal 
legislators used class-based (and potentially racially veiled) arguments 
when discussing the need to protect the innocent, “vulnerable” victims 
harmed by allowing debtors to discharge their debts.165 
C. Ideological Amendments During the Legislative Debates 
In addition to the ideological discussions concerning what it takes to 
become a deserving debtor, BAPCPA also forced legislators to reconcile 
their views concerning financial personal responsibility with their views 
about other ideological issues that were not important to the consumer 
credit lobby. For example, the means test partially subsidizes the 
educational expenses debtors incurred to send their children to private 
schools,166 though this ultimately was expanded to include public school 
costs as well.167 One of the most pointed and prolonged ideological 
conflicts involved the homestead exemption, which forced the legislation’s 
supporters to reconcile their positions on states’ rights (clearly viewed as 
ideological on a liberal-conservative, Democrat-Republican axis) with 
their desire to advance the interests of the consumer credit industry.  
Pre-BAPCPA, the Code gave states a virtually unfettered right to 
decide whether their residents could use state or federal exemption laws to 
shield property from creditor collection attempts.168 Some states—most 
notably, Texas and Florida—let their residents claim an unlimited, or 
virtually unlimited, homestead exemption.169 Because of this, both 
supporters and critics of the legislation introduced amendments creating a 
cap on the value of homes a debtor would be allowed to keep and to 
 
 
 165. For example, Senator Edward Kennedy—who spearheaded many of the amendments that 
protected women who received child support—argued that the legislation would harm “vulnerable 
women” whose “only problem is that their husbands have failed to provide alimony and child 
support.” 151 CONG. REC. S2306, S2323 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). The 
suggestion that the only “vulnerable” women are those who are divorced and do not receive child 
support from a deadbeat dad separates those “deserving” women from never-married mothers who 
would not necessarily be deserving. 
 166. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. REP. 106-970, at 8 (2000). 
 167. H.R. Res. 71, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. REP. NO. 107-4 (2001) (codified at 11 U.S.C. 
§ 707(b)2)(A)(ii)(IV)). 
 168. Congress generally permits state legislators to decide whether their residents can choose 
between federal or state exemption laws or whether they must use the state exemptions. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(b) (2000).  
 169.  FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 4; TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 50. 
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otherwise restrict the availability of generous state exemption laws.170 
Indeed, throughout the legislation’s multi-year march through Congress, 
opponents and supporters of the legislation proposed to amend the 
legislation to place absolute dollar caps on the homestead exemption.171  
Because of concerns that an absolute exemption cap would not respect 
states’ decision to craft the exemption laws that were most suitable for 
their residents, some senators, who otherwise supported the legislation 
initially, opposed amending it to add a homestead cap on federalism 
grounds.172 Similarly, House supporters of the legislation consistently 
voted against amendments that capped the homestead exemption,173 even 
though doing so created the perception that the legislation let wealthy 
debtors avoid paying their creditors yet keep mansions. Ultimately, the 
Code was amended to prevent clearly abusive conduct—for example, 
moving to a state and purchasing a mansion on the eve of a bankruptcy 
 
 
 170. For example, the Senate passed H.R. 3150 by a vote of 97–1 (with two senators not voting) 
even though it contained a $100,000 exemption cap. 144 CONG. REC. 21594, 21623 (1998). See, e.g., 
S. REP. NO. 105-253, at 31 (1998); 144 CONG. REC. 21594, 21597 (1998) (proposing a Senate finding 
that “meaningful bankruptcy reform cannot be achieved without capping the homestead exemption” at 
$100,000 dollars). 
 171. H.R. REP. NO. 106-123, pt. 1 at 102 (1999). Rep. Jackson–Lee introduced legislation that 
would preserve state law prohibitions against the forced sale of a debtor’s homestead. She consistently 
opposed the bankruptcy bills. Because, however, she represents a Congressional district in Texas, she 
also consistently opposed modifications to the Code’s existing treatment of homestead laws despite the 
appearance that allowing unlimited exemptions arguably benefited wealthier debtors. In one debate, 
Rep. Jackson-Lee stated, 
“I was pleased that the homestead exemption capital [sic], $100,000 that was in the Senate 
version of the bill, is not in the conference report. However, I was not pleased to learn that a 
residency requirement was added into the conference report that require people in my home 
State of Texas to live in Texas for at least 2 years or own a home for at least 2 years before 
getting a homestead exemption. This is contrary to our Texas State Constitution, and it would 
not serve our State well. Any suggestions that people rove into the State of Texas and buy big 
expensive homes . . . is an outrage on the citizens of Texas, and we should be left to our own 
ways under our own Constitution on this issue.  
144 CONG. REC. 24926, 25929 (1998). See also 145 CONG. REC. 8498, 8500 (1999) (statement of Rep. 
Delahunt) (discussing amendment capping homestead exemption). 
 172. 147 CONG. REC. 3716, 3724 (2001) (statement of Sen. Hutchison) (“Mr. President, I rise 
today in opposition to the Kohl-Feinstein amendment . . . because it is unwarranted and unwise—it is 
an intrusion upon well-established State constitutions and laws . . . .); 145 CONG. REC. S14481, 
S14481 (1999) (statement of Sen. Hutchison) (“The Kohl-Sessions amendment would overturn the 130 
years of precedence and have a national standard, a one-size-fits-all approach . . . . We do not need one 
size fits all. For 130 years, we have not had it. In this country the States have done very well in setting 
their own homestead exemptions . . . .”). 
 173. See 144 CONG. REC. 11918, 11921 (1998) (statement of Rep. McCollum) (striking 
homestead exemption cap and replacing it with cap limited to people who fraudulently converted 
assets to obtain the exemption).  
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filing.174 BAPCPA does not, however, have an absolute cap and, as a 
result, does not prevent all opportunistic exemption planning.175  
In the clash between federalism concerns (a clear ideological issue on a 
left-right axis) and the desire to please a powerful special interest group, 
ideology prevailed. Rather than force debtors to be responsible and 
downsize their lifestyles by selling their homes to repay their debts, 
Congress stripped homestead caps from the legislation even though these 
caps would have benefited all unsecured creditors, including credit card 
companies. 
D. “Poison Pill” Ideological Amendments  
Some amendments that generally are viewed as ideological on the 
liberal-conservative, Democrat-Republican axis (i.e., the military, 
homestead exemptions, and private school tuition subsidies) appear to 
have been offered to protect the concerns of other special interest groups 
or to protect or advance certain ideological views. In contrast, other 
amendments were introduced solely, many would argue, to derail the bill.  
For example, members offered a series of amendments involving 
tobacco.176 Though none of these amendments made it into BAPCPA, 
members attempted to amend the bankruptcy legislation to make debts 
arising from tobacco-related debts non-dischargeable.177 Likewise, during 
several of the years the bankruptcy legislation was pending, the Senate 
considered amendments that would have prevented debtors from 
discharging debts created by orders or settlements involving the 
obstruction of access to medical facilities that provided abortions.178 
Supporters of the bankruptcy bills viewed these clinic access amendments 
as “poison pill” amendments179 that were unnecessary because the Code 
 
 
 174. Although the House was unwilling to place a homestead cap for all debtors who filed, 
members were willing to deny the exemption to any debtor who converted non-exempt assets into a 
homestead within a year of filing. See 144 CONG. REC. 11918, 11921 (1998) (Gekas Amendment). 
This amendment is similar to the restrictions contained in 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1) (2000). 
 175. See generally Margaret Howard, Exemptions Under the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments: A 
Tale of Opportunity Lost, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 398 at n.7 (2005). 
 176. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House), H.R. 3150, 
105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); 144 CONG. REC. 20068 (1998) (Leahy Amendment No. 3564).  
 177. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House), H.R. 3150, 
105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); 144 CONG. REC. 20068 (1998) (Leahy Amendment No. 3564). 
 178. H.R. REP. No. 108-40, pt. 1, at 142 (2003); H.R. REP. NO. 106-123, pt. 1 at 99 (1997); 148 
CONG. REC. H6132, H6132–33 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 2002) (statement of Rep. Pitts); 145 CONG. REC. 
28822 (Nov. 5, 1999).  
 179. 151 CONG. REC. S2200, S2207 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“I have 
been around here long enough to know a poison pill when I see one. And make no mistake about it, 
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already contained provisions that arguably made these debts non-
dischargeable.180 Most assumed that these amendments were being offered 
for the sole purpose of preventing the legislation from being enacted181 
and, in fact, the opponents at one point achieved their objective. In 2002, 
conservative Republican representatives (who generally supported the 
bankruptcy legislation) rejected the House Republican leadership’s request 
to consider a Senate Report. Instead, they passed a version of the bill 
without the abortion provisions because they refused to support any 
legislation that could be viewed as supporting a woman’s right to choose 
to have an abortion.182  
Senate opponents of the legislation also offered amendments that 
would increase the minimum wage.183 Though the federal minimum wage 
law ostensibly is unrelated to bankruptcy reform, critics of the bankruptcy 
legislation argued that it would be unfair to impose a rigorous means test 
on debtors since the debtors’ low wages may have caused their financial 
distress. To balance the harm caused by the means test, critics argued that 
Congress should also increase the minimum wage.184 Like the clinic 
access amendments, though, the minimum wage amendments were 
consistently defeated and generally were viewed as non-germane poison 
pills.185  
 
 
this has become a classic poison pill amendment.”); 145 CONG. REC. 21995 (1999) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch) (“It is apparent, however, that efforts are underway to defeat this important legislation by 
attaching irrelevant, extraneous ‘political agenda’ items to it, such as minimum wage, guns, abortion, 
and tobacco, to name a few.”). 
 180. For example, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2000) makes debts that result from the debtor’s willful 
and malicious injury non-dischargeable. 
 181. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 79, at 299 (comments of Sam Gerdano, Executive 
Director of the American Bankruptcy Institute, noting that the amendment’s proponent’s goal was “to 
design a killer amendment that brings to bear opponents in the pro-life movement . . . to kill an 
economic bill on bankruptcy reform . . .”). 
 182. See H.R. RES. 606, 107th Cong. (2002 House Roll Call Vote #478), 148 CONG. REC. H8756–
57 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002); Agree to Senate Amendment with an Amendment, Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, House Roll Call Vote #484, 148 CONG. REC. H8876–77 
(daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002). See also Philip Shenon, Vote on Bankruptcy Bill Is Stalled by Abortion 
Provision, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 30, 2002, at C2. See also Roundtable Discussion, supra note 79, at 311 
(2005) (comments of Philip Corwin, discussing the “bizarre incident” involving “a small group of 
dissident far right members” who revolted over the abortion amendment). 
 183. 151 CONG. REC. S1979, S1980 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2005); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, 
146 CONG. REC. 697, 731 (2000). 
 184. 146 CONG. REC. 501, 509 (2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
 185. See 146 CONG. REC. 3155 (2000) (statement of Sen. Lott) (noting that an approved minimum 
wage amendment would stall passage of the bill “because it could be subject to, and would be subject 
to, the so-called blue slip rules of the House”); 145 CONG. REC. 29075, 29086–87 (1999) (motion to 
table minimum wage amendment passed by a vote of 50–48). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/7
p 1861 Dickerson book pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] REGULATING BANKRUPTCY 1899 
 
 
 
 
E. Pre-Enactment Racial Politics 
Given the often polarizing nature of racial group politics in this 
country, it was somewhat surprising that race played so little role in the 
BAPCPA legislative debates. The House report that accompanied 
BAPCPA makes only one direct reference to a racial minority group186 
and mentions the phrases “minorities” and “civil rights” (or any variation) 
in only two speeches.187 A search of the Congressional Record of the 
legislative debates for the bankruptcy bills reveals that the phrases 
“African-American,” “black”, “Latino,” or “Hispanic” appear in less than 
twenty-five speeches during the debate,188 and the vast majority of these 
references relate to minority homeowners who the speakers contended 
likely would have benefited from the failed predatory lending amendments 
or wage earners who would have benefited from the failed minimum wage 
amendments.189 Although opponents argued that the bankruptcy 
legislation would harm minorities and noted that civil rights organizations 
opposed the legislation,190 none of the amendments that arguably would 
have helped minorities—such as those concerning predatory lending or 
raising the minimum wage—passed.191 Moreover, the minimum wage bill 
largely was viewed as another poison pill.192 Of course, that these 
amendments failed—and that most references to racial minorities involved 
minority homeowners—could be the result of this country’s lingering 
 
 
 186. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 398 (2005) (mentioning African-Americans). 
 187. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 386, 398 (2005). 
 188. Westlaw search conducted by author on April 13, 2007, on the “Bankruptcy Reform Act 
Congressional Record” database (BKRA-CR), using the search terms “African-American,” “black”, 
“Latino”, and “Hispanic.”. In contrast, in that same database, the phrase “personal responsibility” 
appears more than sixty times.  
 189. See 151 CONG. REC. H1993, H2064 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Jackson-
Lee) (arguing that African-American homeowners often fall prey to predatory lending practices).  
 190. 151 CONG. REC. H1974, H1983 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (letter of Leadership Conference on 
Civil Rights); 147 CONG. REC. S2361 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
 191. Sen. Kennedy urged fellow senators to support an amendment (which failed) that allowed 
debtors an unlimited exemption for their retirement savings because of the low rate of minority 
pension participation. 147 CONG. REC. (2001) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Although this amendment 
theoretically helps minorities, the benefits would have been relatively minimal since minorities have a 
significantly lower pension participation rate than whites. That is, given the disparity between white 
and minority pension participation rates and the value of those pensions, this amendment 
disproportionately benefits white debtors since they are more likely than minority debtors to have any 
type of pensions or to have a large pension that they would want to protect in bankruptcy. See 
generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy Reform, 71 MO. L. REV. 919, 932 
(2006). 
 192. 146 CONG. REC. 3155 (2000) (statement of Sen. Lott); 145 CONG. REC. 29075, 29086–87 
(1999).  
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ambivalence toward, and occasional hostility to, the economic conditions 
facing blacks, especially poor blacks.193  
VI. RE-TELLING THE BAPCPA STORY 
A. Interest Groups and Ideology before BAPCPA’s Effective Date 
By February 2005, when the Senate again began to consider 
bankruptcy legislation, Congress appeared to conclude that it had reached 
appropriate compromises to protect the interests of all relevant groups and 
all concerns (ideological and other).194 To ensure quick passage of 
BAPCPA and to ensure that the clinic access, homestead exemption, 
minimum wage, or any other poison pill amendment did not derail the 
legislation, few amendments passed or were even allowed to be 
considered.195 Not surprisingly, of the amendments that passed, one was 
related to provisions that would allow a debtor to include health or 
disability insurance payments as expenses for the purposes of the means 
test196 and three were anti-Enron amendments.197 Amendments that would 
have raised the homestead exemption level for seniors, that would have 
exempted consumers victimized by identify theft from the means test, and 
that would have required credit counseling agencies to provide free 
 
 
 193. A. Mechele Dickerson, America’s Uneasy Relationship with the Working Poor, 51 HASTINGS 
L.J. 17, 29–31 (1999). This country’s unease with the notion that we may well have a permanent 
underclass may also explain why opponents of the legislation consistently referred to bankruptcy as a 
safety net for the “middle class” that helps hard-working individuals maintain a typical—but not 
lavish—American lifestyle. See Warren, supra note 43, at 29 (describing the bankruptcy system as a 
“safety net for the financial health of American women” and noting that bankruptcy lets these middle 
class debtors “discharge certain debts . . . so that they can pay the mortgage or rent, utility bills, tuition, 
and car payments . . .”). See also Donald R. Korobkin, Bankruptcy Law, Ritual, and Performance, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 2124, 2131 (2003) (“Insulating mostly middle-class debtors from the experience of 
long-term poverty, the bankruptcy process protects the political power of the middle class . . . .”). 
 194. See 151 CONG. REC. S1855 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“We have 
all cooperated and compromised at great length in order to enact this legislation . . . . I do not believe 
there is any need to reopen this bill and to disrupt the many compromises we have already 
reached . . . .”) 
 195. 151 CONG. REC. H1974, H1976 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (listing amendments the House 
Rules committee refused to consider). 
 196. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2000). 
 197. These amendments limited corporate executives’ bonuses and pay, made certain securities 
fraud debts non-dischargeable, and made it easier to appoint a trustee in a Chapter 11 case if fraud is 
suspected. These amendments are codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(c), 523(a)(19), 1104 (2000). 
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services to recent veterans who served in combat zones were defeated by a 
party-line vote.198  
On March 10, 2005, the Senate voted in favor of BAPCPA by a vote of 
74–25 (which included all Republicans and 18 Democrats).199 Then, on 
April 14, 2005, the House voted by a vote of 302–126 (which included all 
Republicans and 73 Democrats).200 In signing the bill into law, President 
Bush stated that the bill was needed to prevent fraud and to reinforce the 
principle that this country “is a nation of personal responsibility where 
people are expected to meet their obligations.”201 
Although, as noted earlier, racial group politics were largely absent 
during BAPCPA’s pre-enactment debates, race became a clear factor after 
BAPCPA was enacted but before it became fully effective. On August 29, 
2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated the Louisiana and Mississippi Gulf 
Coast region. Opponents attempted to use the racially charged atmosphere 
surrounding the federal government’s abysmal response to this disaster to 
derail BAPCPA.202 Although the full extent of Katrina’s overall economic 
harm to the residents of the Gulf Coast has yet to be determined, when 
Katrina struck, sixty-seven percent (or roughly 307,000) of the 
approximately 454,800 residents in Orleans Parish were black.203 Given 
this demographic profile and the likelihood that blacks would suffer 
disproportionately greater economic losses than whites,204 the 
Congressional Black Caucus (“CBC”) and other members of Congress 
proposed legislation that would have protected the families and small 
 
 
 198. A few amendments that were designed to protect veterans and active duty members of the 
military did pass, though amendments that would have protected service members from debts related 
to payday loans were rejected. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 376–91, 418–22, 476–74 (2005). 
 199.  151 CONG. REC. S2474 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005). 
 200.  151 CONG. REC. H2075–76 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005). 
 201. Press Release, White House, President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention, Consumer 
Protection Act (Apr. 20, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/ 
20050420-5.html. 
 202.  See Press Release, Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Nadler, Conyers, Watt, Jackson Lee to Introduce Bill 
to Relieve Debt Burden on Katrina Survivors (Sept. 1, 2005), http://www.house.gov/list/press/ 
ny08_nadler/debtreliefkatrina090105.html (“Our common sense bill will insure that we do not 
compound a natural disaster with a man made financial disaster.”). 
 203. See U.S. Census Bureau, State & Count Quick Facts, Orleans Parish, Louisiana, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/22071.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2007).  
 204. Although Katrina’s impact by race was not clear in the first few days after the hurricane, a 
recent study indicates that Katrina’s impact (in both Louisiana and Mississippi) was disproportionately 
borne by blacks, renters, the poor, and those who were unemployed. See John R. Logan, The Impact of 
Katrina: Race and Class in Storm-Damaged Neighborhoods, http://www.s4.brown.edu/Katrina/ 
report.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2007) (stating that 45.8 percent of the heavily damaged areas were in 
predominately black neighborhoods while only 26.4 percent of the undamaged areas were in black 
neighborhoods). 
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businesses who were financially devastated by the hurricane.205 Although 
only twenty-five percent of the members of the CBC voted for 
BAPCPA,206 and the CBC did not attempt to block the legislation, the 
CBC membership supported these post-enactment amendments.  
The Katrina amendments were designed to allow hurricane victims to 
file for bankruptcy under pre-BAPCPA law,207 to avoid most effects of the 
means test,208 or to generally delay BAPCPA’s effective date.209 As was 
true of most attempts to derail the legislation by introducing clearly 
ideological amendments (like the ones involving abortion or the minimum 
wage), and of virtually all efforts in 2005 to amend BAPCPA to 
accommodate the concerns of other interest groups, BAPCPA’s supporters 
opposed and ultimately defeated all legislative attempts to provide 
bankruptcy relief to people harmed by natural disasters, including those 
devastated by Hurricanes Katrina or Rita.  
B. BAPCPA’s Multiple Story Lines 
Opponents of the legislation argued that BAPCPA was written, bought, 
and paid for by the consumer credit lobby, and news reports frequently 
cited the millions of dollars this lobby contributed to individual members 
or to political action groups. No one suggested, however, that the 
BAPCPA story should be told as one that involved Congress being 
captured by women, custodial parents, retirees, or service members. 
Perhaps that is because those groups influence Congress by their potential 
votes, not their potential campaign contributions. Yet, a public choice 
 
 
 205. See Press Release, Rep. Jerrold Nadler, supra note 202 (expressing desire to prevent 
Hurricane Katrina survivors from harm, or an “unintended financial whammy,” that might be caused 
by BAPCPA). 
 206. Twenty-five percent of the members of the CBC in 2005 voted for BAPCPA. There were 
forty-three African-Americans in Congress. See Mildred L. Amer, Black Members of the United States 
Congress: 1870–2005, CRS Report for Congress at 2, http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/ 
pdf/RL30378.pdf. Of the forty-one that voted, ten (or twenty-five percent) voted in favor of BAPCPA. 
See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 108, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2005/roll108.xml.  
 207.  Financial Safeguards for Hurricane Survivors Act of 2005, H.R. 3662, 109th Cong. § 2 
(2005). 
 208. Hurricane Katrina Bankruptcy Relief and Community Protection Act of 2005, S. 1647, 109th 
Cong. § 6 (2005); Katrina Emergency Relief Act of 2005, S. 1637, 109th Cong. § 451 (2005). 
 209. Financial Safeguards for Hurricane Survivors Act of 2005, H.R. 3662, 109th Cong. § 2 
(2005); Hurricane Katrina Bankruptcy Relief and Community Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3697, 
109th Cong. § 9 (2005). Ironically, when Congress originally considered BAPCPA in 2005, one 
member of Congress offered an amendment to protect the victims of natural disasters. That 
amendment, like virtually all others that would have made it easier for people to avoid the effects of 
BAPCPA, was defeated without debate. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1 at 502 (amendment offered by 
Rep. Jackson-Lee). 
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analysis properly would consider whether legislators were motivated by 
the self-interests of all relevant constituents—both campaign contributors 
and voters.  
The single industry capture theory may explain why liberal and 
conservative, Democratic and Republican members of Congress 
consistently supported BAPCPA. And, it seems likely that at least some 
members’ support for the bankruptcy legislation was influenced by their 
desire to continue to receive the support of the financial services industry. 
Equally plausible, though, is the story that members of Congress 
supported a bill that most conceded was drafted by representatives for the 
consumer credit lobby because they concluded that it was safe to vote for 
the significantly revised and diluted BAPCPA which, once reformed, 
adequately protected the interests of all relevant groups.210 Although those 
constituent interests were not strong enough to prevent Congress from 
enacting BAPCPA, the desire not to alienate women, members of the 
armed forces, veterans, and seniors clearly influenced BAPCPA’s final 
contents. Thus, even if members of Congress may have been inclined to 
support the bill because of the financial support they received—and hoped 
to receive in the future—from the consumer credit industry, they appeared 
reluctant to vote for a bill that might offend a large number of their 
constituents.  
In addition, that BAPCPA primarily benefited the consumer credit 
lobby does not mean that the legislators who supported the bill disagreed 
with the bill’s normative view of personal responsibility. Of course, it is 
difficult to determine with certainty whether a legislator supported a bill 
because of her personal ideological views or because of her constituents’ 
interests.211 However, to fully tell the BAPCPA story, it is important to 
acknowledge that some members may have been willing to vote for a bill 
that had harsh consequences for some people because of the legislators’ 
ideological view that bankruptcy laws need to impose a rigid sense of 
personal responsibility—incur only those debts you can repay and repay 
all debts you incur. 
Because so much of the debate revolved around finding the best 
formula to calculate who is a can-pay, the legislation appeared to be just a 
technical, non-politicized amendment to a technical federal statute. It is 
likely, though, that this would have changed if bankruptcy had instead 
 
 
 210. An undefined group of potential debtors, or generally of people, who seek to avoid paying 
their debts, would not of course be viewed as an important interest group. 
 211. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 67, at 897 n.149 (citing studies which sought to determine 
how great a role ideology plays on legislators’ votes). 
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been labeled “ideological.” The mere label likely would have generated a 
different type of public and media attention during the legislative 
process212 and likely would have altered the behavior of members of 
Congress. In any decisionmaking process—whether political or not—
labels and stereotypes matter.213 Indeed, by not explicitly characterizing 
the bill as ideological, moderate and liberal members of Congress received 
political cover and were allowed to vote for a bill that potentially harms all 
but the upper class and that punishes even those financially distressed 
Americans who did not engage in illegal or immoral activities. 
That Congress avoided having a full discussion of what personal 
responsibility means is unfortunate because such a discussion likely would 
have forced the legislation’s supporters to explain their views of personal 
responsibility and to disclose just how much of a person’s human capital 
they think should be devoted to repaying his/her debts. Had the bill been 
viewed as ideological, legislators would have been forced to clearly 
explain which debtors they felt deserved to discharge their debts—e.g., 
those who had unexpected medical expenses—and which were 
undeserving debtors—e.g., those who ran up their credit cards after they 
got a divorce. Because the bill was never viewed and characterized as 
ideological, legislators could avoid admitting that they believed that 
debtors who were in financial distress because of over-spending should be 
forced to suffer the consequences of their financial choices, even if they 
chose to overspend because they lost a job or got a divorce. Had the bill 
been cast as an ideological one, legislators perhaps would have explained 
whether they felt people should repay their bills using any means 
necessary, even if it took a long time and required them, and their 
dependents or family members, to make significant personal sacrifices.  
Finally, since most of the public criticisms of the legislative process 
involved the vote-buying story and the empirical debate over how to 
define a can-pay, members of Congress could avoid examining whether 
the American Dream remains a possibility to most families. As so many 
debtors file for bankruptcy because of their desire to “cling to homes that 
are weighted down with debt,”214 Congress may at some point be forced to 
revisit all federal policies that encourage and subsidize homeownership 
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and may need to consider whether certain members of society should rent 
a home rather than borrow lavishly or foolishly to try to become and 
remain a homeowner.215 It is possible that a large segment of the United 
States population may no longer be able to attain and retain the traditional 
middle class lifestyle of owning a home or car, subsidizing their children’s 
education, or of having a secure financial future. Likewise, it is possible 
that it is no longer plausible for people to avoid financial distress simply 
by working hard and assuming that that hard work is enough.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Legislative opponents’ one-line explanation for BAPCPA is that it was 
bought and paid for by the consumer credit lobby. Legislative supporters’ 
one-line explanation is that it was needed to prevent abuse and ensure that 
consumers learned the importance of personal responsibility. Certainly, 
the financial services creditors generally, and the credit card industry 
specifically, were instrumental in forcing Congress to consider—and 
ultimately enact—legislation that forces most debtors to “pass” a means 
test before they are allowed to proceed in Chapter 7. The role that special 
interest groups—other than the consumer credit industry—and ideology 
played during the legislative process remains, however, largely an untold 
story.  
Treating BAPCPA as a story of simple credit card industry capture 
fails to take into account the compromises members of Congress made in 
their attempt not to alienate monied constituents or potentially powerful 
voting constituent interest groups (like women, retirees, or military 
members). And, although bankruptcy is viewed by many as being non-
ideological and the legislative debates were not framed in pure ideological 
terms, using a single storyline to explain BAPCPA does not adequately 
account for the importance of individual legislators’ ideological views that 
people should not incur more debts than they can pay and should repay all 
their debts if they choose to incur them. 
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